Nuclear Detonation, A mistake?
- Thread starter sigatoka
- Start date
RAPTOR said:
Oh please, dont act like a gora.:stupid:
Your post implied that Pakistan got the bombs from a third party source, so I asked you to explain the statement. I didnt ask you to explain what "got it" means, I didnt think you were so naive.
You have to have a lesson in forum etiquette, you are seriously lacking it.
Jay_ said:Oh please, dont act like a gora.:stupid:
Your post implied that Pakistan got the bombs from a third party source, so I asked you to explain the statement. I didnt ask you to explain what "got it" means, I didnt think you were so naive.
.
Please refrain from your usual absurdity.
And if you didnt understand the previous post, have a translator explain it to you.
Thanx.
sigatoka said:
Heres a brief description of Israel's Nuclear capabilities.
Israel’s Nuclear Programme
Israel began showing interest in acquiring nuclear weapons right from its creation in 1948. The Israel Atomic Energy Commission was established in 1952. By 1953, a process for extracting uranium, found in the Negev desert, was perfected, and a new method of producing heavy water was developed – providing Israel with an indigenous capability to produce some of the most important nuclear materials used in reprocessing facilities i.e. to produce weapon-grade plutonium. France provided the bulk of early nuclear assistance to Israel, including the construction of Dimona - a heavy water-moderated, natural uranium reactor and plutonium reprocessing facility, situated near Bersheeba in the Negev Desert. It was the result of an agreement signed with France in 1953, for atomic cooperation, and later a secret agreement concluded between Israel and France in 1957. The Dimona reactor became critical in 1964, and started producing approximately 8 kg of plutonium per year, enough for the manufacture of one to two fission weapons after reprocessing.1 Dimona forms the basis of Israel’s nuclear programme.
The US intelligence sources first detected the construction of Dimona plant in 1958, but it was not identified as a nuclear site until two years later when Israel admitted that the Dimona complex was a nuclear research centre built for ‘peaceful purposes.’ Throughout the 1960s, the CIA tracked the developments at Dimona. By the mid-1960s it had determined that the Israeli nuclear weapons programme was an established and irreversible fact.2 Despite concrete evidence of Israel’s clandestine nuclear activities, the US did nothing to stop it. In 1968, the CIA issued a report that Israel had successfully started production of nuclear weapons. Except for a few token visits made in 1960s by US inspection teams, Dimona has not been subjected to international inspections.
On September 22, 1979, a US satellite detected an atmospheric test of a small thermonuclear bomb in the Indian Ocean off South Africa but, because of Israel’s apparent involvement, the report was quickly ‘whitewashed’. Later it was learned through Israeli sources that there were actually three carefully guarded tests of miniaturised Israeli nuclear artillery shells.3 It was also reported that Israel acquired data on thermonuclear tests from France and the US, and might have developed thermonuclear weapons. Seymour Hersh, in his book, The Sampson Option, written in 1991, has claimed that by 1990 Israel had developed low-yield weapons for artillery and landmines, as well as thermonuclear weapons.4
Apart from production of weapon-grade plutonium at Dimona, Israel’s other major weapons facilities include: nuclear weapons design facility at Nahal Soreq; missile test facility at Kefar Zekharya; nuclear weapons assembly facility at Yodefat; and tactical nuclear weapons storage facility at Eilabun.5
The actual size and composition of Israel’s nuclear stockpile is uncertain. Estimates vary from 100 to 500 warheads. It is widely reported that Israel had two nuclear bombs during the 1967 Six-Day War, and in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israelis had reportedly 13 twenty-kiloton atomic bombs. In 1986 Mordechai Vanunu, an Israeli nuclear technician who had worked at Dimona, disclosed details and photographs of Israeli nuclear weapons programme, which were published in the London Sunday Times, and consequently led experts to conclude that Israel had a stockpile of 100 to 200 devices at the time. The US-based Federation of American Scientists (FAS) estimates of Israeli stockpiles of 100 to 200 warheads are based on the rate at which weapon grade plutonium was being produced at the Dimona nuclear reactor.6 According to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists estimates, Israel has the world’s fifth-largest stockpile of nuclear warheads - more than Britain’s 185 (the other four states with world’s largest nuclear stockpiles are the US, Russia, China and France). Other sources, such as Jane’s Intelligence Review, estimate that Tel Aviv has between 400 and 500 nuclear weapons.7 Whatever the number, there is little doubt that Israeli nukes are among the world’s most sophisticated.
Delivery Systems
Missiles
Israel has a well-developed missile industry, producing ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as missile defence systems and unmanned aerial vehicles. The Jericho missile series was initiated in 1960s with the help of France. Jericho-1, completed in 1973, is a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) with a 500 km range, 500 kg payload and can be equipped with conventional as well as nuclear warheads. There are reports that Israel has deployed upto 50 nuclear-tipped Jericho-1 missiles on mobile launchers near Jerusalem. The intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), Jericho-2, deployed in 1990, has a range of 1500 km and a payload of 1000 kg.8 It is believed that there are a total of 100 Jericho-1 and Jericho-2 missiles deployed by Israel. Israel’s successful satellite launches using the Shavit space launch vehicle (SLV) suggest that Israel could quickly develop missile platforms with much longer ranges than the Jericho-2.9 There are unconfirmed reports of a Jericho-3 programme under development using the Shavit technology, with a range of upto 4500 km and 1000 kg payload. Israel also has an advanced spy-satellite system that provides both the Israeli Government and military with vital information on its Middle Eastern neighbours.
Israel’s nuclear-tipped Jericho-I and Jericho-2 missiles alone are capable of hitting targets anywhere in Syria, the whole of Iraq, some parts of Iran including its capital, Tehran, they can easily cover more than half of Saudi Arabia, as far as Riyadh, the entire Egypt and Jordan, and some parts of Libya. If reports of Jericho-3 development are true then Israel’s threat not only covers the entire Middle East, but extends far beyond – the missiles can reach as far as Pakistan, major parts of India, some parts of China, all the Central Asian states, Southeast Russia, the entire Europe and majority of states in the African continent.
Jericho Missile Ranges
Jericho-1_________ 500 km
Jericho-2 - - - - - - - - 1500 km
Source: Missile ranges have been added by the author to the map taken from Encarta Atlas
1998.
Israel is also developing the Homa anti-tactical ballistic missile system. It is a ten-year initiative to provide an anti-missile umbrella shield to protect Israel’s population centres. Partly funded by the US, it is expected to be the world’s most advanced missile interceptor system. The centrepiece of the project is Arrow. Arrow-1 and Arrow-2 are anti-tactical ballistic missiles with limited area coverage tailored to Israel’s needs and limited geographic area. The Arrow-2 is supposed to intercept incoming missile warheads at ranges of 40-50 km. Each battery of Arrow-2 can be equipped with at least 50 missiles. Israel has plans to deploy three batteries of Arrow, which will cover upto 85 % of its population. The first was deployed in 2000, the second in 2002, and the third is expected to be deployed in 2004.10
Israel’s Ballistic Missiles
Missile Range Payload Origin Deployed/YearLance 130 km 450 kg USA 1975
Jericho-1 500 km 500 kg Indigenous/ 1970-3
France
Jericho-2 1500 km 1000 kg Indigenous/ 1990
USA
Jericho-3 4500- 1000 kg Unconfirmed reports of the 4800 km missile under development
Shavit (SLV) 4500 km 150-250 kg Indigenous Launched 1988, 1990, 1995
Compiled from sources:
1. ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East’, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/ball_dep.htm
2. ‘Israel’s Aerospace & Defence industry’, Jane’s Special Report, 2001, pp. 37-38, 43
RAPTOR said:
If you say something, its a general etiquette that you are expected to explain it incase some one cannot follow you.
Since you cannot seem to be patient enough to do that, I guess your message is as good as a rhetoric and can be ignored.
Thanks for proving that point
Israel's Air and Sea Based Delivery systems
Aircrafts
Israel’s air-based, nuclear-capable delivery vehicles include approximately 50 F-4E-2000 Phantom aircrafts with a 1600 km range, and 205 F-16 Falcon aircrafts with a 630 km range, which are capable of carrying nuclear and chemical bombs.11 Both aircrafts are American in origin. It is believed that Israel’s nuclear forces were put on high alert during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. An F-4E squadron was placed on high alert, ready to strike with the country’s nuclear arsenal. Although the battle turned in Israel’s favour, it appears that in 1973 the Middle East came quite close to a nuclear conflict.
Submarines
Israel has also acquired three Type 800 Dolphin class submarines from Germany in 1998-9. Two of these were ‘donated’ by Germany. There are some suspicions that the US might have paid for the submarines. The Dolphins have nearly a 3,000-mile operating range and are equipped to launch conventional torpedoes or long range nuclear-capable cruise missiles.12 Reports by Federation of American Scientists of a May 2000 test launch indicated that Israel has a 1500 km range nuclear-capable cruise missile that can be launched from its new Dolphin-class submarines.13 A version of Popeye Turbo cruise missiles is being developed to be deployed on Dolphin submarines.
According to one report, Israel and the US officials have admitted collaborating to deploy the US-supplied Harpoon cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads in Israel’s fleet of submarines, giving Israel the ability to strike at any of its Arab neighbours.14 Although it had long been suspected that Israel bought the three German submarines with the specific aim of arming them with nuclear cruise missiles, the admission that the two countries have collaborated in arming the fleet with a nuclear-capable weapons system has come significantly at a time of growing crisis between Israel and its neighbours. The disclosure was made amid rapidly escalating tensions following a raid by Israeli jets in October 2003, on an alleged terrorist training camp near the Syrian capital, Damascus, and after Israel had announced that states ‘harbouring terrorists’ are legitimate targets (similarity with the US pre-emptive strategy discussed in later sections). Making the knowledge public that the submarines are armed with nuclear weapons was designed to deter a counter-attack on Israel. In an interview with the Los Angeles Times, Israeli and Bush administration officials stated that the sea-launch capability gives Israel the ability to target Iran more easily, in case the Iranians develop their own nuclear weapons – a statement that holds an open threat.15
The Dolphins can operate in the Mediterranean, and can hit any target in Libya. Moreover, they can patrol the Indian Ocean, permitting targeting of sites in Iran or any of the key Saudi bases in the country’s southern desert. Israel’s sea borne nuclear doctrine is designed to place one submarine in the Persian Gulf, the other in Mediterranean, with a third on standby.
Israel’s fleet of submarines is the first such force in the region to be armed with nuclear-tipped missiles and gives it a second-strike capability, which means that if its nuclear arsenal, which is primarily land-based, were destroyed in a missile attack it would still be able to retaliate with devastating power from the sea against any aggressor. It also gives Israel the ability to launch pre-emptive strikes, nuclear or conventional, far from its own shores. Having established a triad of nuclear forces, Israel can now target any country in the Middle East and beyond, if it chooses, while remaining relatively immune from counter-attack.
Israel’s Nuclear Strategy
The twin pillars of Israeli nuclear policy have been – ambiguity about its own nuclear programme; and a commitment to denying Arab states any level of nuclearisation.
Israel does not have an overt nuclear doctrine beyond its insistence that it will not introduce nuclear weapons into the region. Instead, it follows a policy of what Avner Cohen calls ‘nuclear opacity’ – possessing nuclear weapons while denying their existence. This has allowed Israel to enjoy the benefits of being a nuclear weapons state in terms of deterrence without having to suffer the international repercussions of acknowledging their arsenal.16
This neither-confirm-nor-deny posture has evolved since the late 1960s, partly as an Israeli hedge against the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Israel resisted pressure by the Johnson administration to sign the NPT in 1968, and in 1970 it obtained from the Nixon administration a set of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ understandings. Those understandings persist till today, and the US no longer presses Israel to sign the NPT. In return, Israel is committed to maintaining a low-profile nuclear posture-no testing, no declaration, no acknowledgement.17
All states in the Middle East have signed the NPT except Israel. The UN General Assembly and IAEA have adopted 13 resolutions since 1987 appealing to Israel to join the treaty, which have been ignored by Israel. This is also part of Israel’s strategy of ambiguity; signing the NPT would mean opening Israel’s nuclear sites to IAEA inspections, and the ambiguity would be lost. Israel’s refusal to sign the NPT has hampered regional arms negotiations and negotiations for a nuclear weapons free zone in Middle East. Other states in the region resent the fact that despite possessing the nukes, Israel stubbornly refuses to acknowledge them openly.
Israel also has a strong commitment to preserving its nuclear monopoly by preventing other states in the region from developing nuclear weapons capability, as was evidenced by Israel’s 1981 raid on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear installation. The danger in this policy lies in the fact that Israel is willing to use any means to prevent other states in the region from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Israel’s unofficial stance regarding its nuclear weapons has been that they were developed for deterrence purposes, to ensure the survival of the small state, and that they are weapons of ‘last resort’. However, Israel’s nuclear weapons capability goes far beyond any conceivable ‘deterrence’ requirements.
Israel has long practiced a strategy of pre-emption, following the US lead post 9/11, dangerous turn in its policy can be seen from the statement of Israel’s Foreign Ministry spokesman that ‘Israel views every state that is harbouring terrorist organisations who are attacking innocent citizens of the state of Israel as legitimate targets out of self defence’18 — a clear echo of the US president Bush’s doctrine of pre-emption. What needs to be understood is that Israel is widening its scope of use of force — conventional or nuclear.
Aircrafts
Israel’s air-based, nuclear-capable delivery vehicles include approximately 50 F-4E-2000 Phantom aircrafts with a 1600 km range, and 205 F-16 Falcon aircrafts with a 630 km range, which are capable of carrying nuclear and chemical bombs.11 Both aircrafts are American in origin. It is believed that Israel’s nuclear forces were put on high alert during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. An F-4E squadron was placed on high alert, ready to strike with the country’s nuclear arsenal. Although the battle turned in Israel’s favour, it appears that in 1973 the Middle East came quite close to a nuclear conflict.
Submarines
Israel has also acquired three Type 800 Dolphin class submarines from Germany in 1998-9. Two of these were ‘donated’ by Germany. There are some suspicions that the US might have paid for the submarines. The Dolphins have nearly a 3,000-mile operating range and are equipped to launch conventional torpedoes or long range nuclear-capable cruise missiles.12 Reports by Federation of American Scientists of a May 2000 test launch indicated that Israel has a 1500 km range nuclear-capable cruise missile that can be launched from its new Dolphin-class submarines.13 A version of Popeye Turbo cruise missiles is being developed to be deployed on Dolphin submarines.
According to one report, Israel and the US officials have admitted collaborating to deploy the US-supplied Harpoon cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads in Israel’s fleet of submarines, giving Israel the ability to strike at any of its Arab neighbours.14 Although it had long been suspected that Israel bought the three German submarines with the specific aim of arming them with nuclear cruise missiles, the admission that the two countries have collaborated in arming the fleet with a nuclear-capable weapons system has come significantly at a time of growing crisis between Israel and its neighbours. The disclosure was made amid rapidly escalating tensions following a raid by Israeli jets in October 2003, on an alleged terrorist training camp near the Syrian capital, Damascus, and after Israel had announced that states ‘harbouring terrorists’ are legitimate targets (similarity with the US pre-emptive strategy discussed in later sections). Making the knowledge public that the submarines are armed with nuclear weapons was designed to deter a counter-attack on Israel. In an interview with the Los Angeles Times, Israeli and Bush administration officials stated that the sea-launch capability gives Israel the ability to target Iran more easily, in case the Iranians develop their own nuclear weapons – a statement that holds an open threat.15
The Dolphins can operate in the Mediterranean, and can hit any target in Libya. Moreover, they can patrol the Indian Ocean, permitting targeting of sites in Iran or any of the key Saudi bases in the country’s southern desert. Israel’s sea borne nuclear doctrine is designed to place one submarine in the Persian Gulf, the other in Mediterranean, with a third on standby.
Israel’s fleet of submarines is the first such force in the region to be armed with nuclear-tipped missiles and gives it a second-strike capability, which means that if its nuclear arsenal, which is primarily land-based, were destroyed in a missile attack it would still be able to retaliate with devastating power from the sea against any aggressor. It also gives Israel the ability to launch pre-emptive strikes, nuclear or conventional, far from its own shores. Having established a triad of nuclear forces, Israel can now target any country in the Middle East and beyond, if it chooses, while remaining relatively immune from counter-attack.
Israel’s Nuclear Strategy
The twin pillars of Israeli nuclear policy have been – ambiguity about its own nuclear programme; and a commitment to denying Arab states any level of nuclearisation.
Israel does not have an overt nuclear doctrine beyond its insistence that it will not introduce nuclear weapons into the region. Instead, it follows a policy of what Avner Cohen calls ‘nuclear opacity’ – possessing nuclear weapons while denying their existence. This has allowed Israel to enjoy the benefits of being a nuclear weapons state in terms of deterrence without having to suffer the international repercussions of acknowledging their arsenal.16
This neither-confirm-nor-deny posture has evolved since the late 1960s, partly as an Israeli hedge against the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Israel resisted pressure by the Johnson administration to sign the NPT in 1968, and in 1970 it obtained from the Nixon administration a set of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ understandings. Those understandings persist till today, and the US no longer presses Israel to sign the NPT. In return, Israel is committed to maintaining a low-profile nuclear posture-no testing, no declaration, no acknowledgement.17
All states in the Middle East have signed the NPT except Israel. The UN General Assembly and IAEA have adopted 13 resolutions since 1987 appealing to Israel to join the treaty, which have been ignored by Israel. This is also part of Israel’s strategy of ambiguity; signing the NPT would mean opening Israel’s nuclear sites to IAEA inspections, and the ambiguity would be lost. Israel’s refusal to sign the NPT has hampered regional arms negotiations and negotiations for a nuclear weapons free zone in Middle East. Other states in the region resent the fact that despite possessing the nukes, Israel stubbornly refuses to acknowledge them openly.
Israel also has a strong commitment to preserving its nuclear monopoly by preventing other states in the region from developing nuclear weapons capability, as was evidenced by Israel’s 1981 raid on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear installation. The danger in this policy lies in the fact that Israel is willing to use any means to prevent other states in the region from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Israel’s unofficial stance regarding its nuclear weapons has been that they were developed for deterrence purposes, to ensure the survival of the small state, and that they are weapons of ‘last resort’. However, Israel’s nuclear weapons capability goes far beyond any conceivable ‘deterrence’ requirements.
Israel has long practiced a strategy of pre-emption, following the US lead post 9/11, dangerous turn in its policy can be seen from the statement of Israel’s Foreign Ministry spokesman that ‘Israel views every state that is harbouring terrorist organisations who are attacking innocent citizens of the state of Israel as legitimate targets out of self defence’18 — a clear echo of the US president Bush’s doctrine of pre-emption. What needs to be understood is that Israel is widening its scope of use of force — conventional or nuclear.
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