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Revisiting 1962 war with China: When India's prestige was in a shambles

Too much delusions make India a laughing stock in the world.

From "Superpower by 2012" to "Super-supercomputer by 2017" , or "Manned space flight by 2015"....... :partay:

You never cease to amuse. :cheesy:

They entertain two-dimensional temporal delusions: 1) Imbued in Distant Past, and 2) Projected in Near at-hand Future. A full buffet of delusions, fantasies and fancies. 😂😂😂
 
Are you blind or retarded? I've already given the link of Hindustan Times where it has been clearly said that Astra missile contract will reduce India's dependency on Russian R-77 and Israeli Derby beyond-visual-range missiles. As far as avionics are concerned, SU-30 MKI is now equipped with DRDO developed Dhruti DR-118 RWR
Integration of the Indian fighter fleets with superior Israeli Software Defined Radios (BNET-AR/Global-Link) now stands complete. Pilots can communicate with each other without been eavesdropped by the rival pilots in the vicinity.
Su-30MKI also now features an indigenous ANS-1100A VOR/ILS System that helps aircraft navigate by using fixed ground-based beacons when coming for landing and an Upgraded RAM-1701AS Radio Altimeter which aids Pilot to carry out low level or night flight below 2500 feet.

It's worth noting that N011M is not simply a PESA, but instead, it's a transition between PESA and AESA in that it adopts technologies from both: each transceiver on the antenna array of N011M has its own receiver amplifier, which is the same as AESA, and with noise level of 3dB, which is also in the same class of AESA arrays. However, for transmitting, N011M uses PESA technology in that a single Chelnok traveling wave tube is used for EGSP-6A transmitter. There are three receiving channels for N011M

the PL-15 is still superior to those Astra and especially the Derby missiles.

and a whole RWR (standard on all new chinese jets since later versions of the j-7 decades ago) and a "transition between PESA and AESA" radar.

and secure communications and navigation is like basic, what are you bragging about here? indians brag about their cars having wheels too?

lol so yea okay. my point stands, in no universe is the MKI better than J-16 or J-11 BG/D .

and again your article states the entire western theater command, they have J-20 now.
 
China is a war monger by nature. All they know is annexing and destroying their own history. Their homogeneous population lost every independent thinker. The red party folks are just a bunch of sycophants.
Then India is much more than that. The illegal occupation and annexation of Kasmir and adjacent areas, the illegal annexation of Junagadh and Manavadar ( which are Pakistani territories btw), and similar other examples in the North.
India never accepted Pakistan and always tried to destabilize it. They did their best by supporting all the terrorist activities in Pakistan.
India has issues with all of its neighbors including tiny Bhutan and Srilanka. Keep bullying its neighbors.
India always wanted Pakistan back (Mahabharat, right).
Why are you crying now?

@SIPRA https://theprint.in/defence/modi-go...-toughest-projects-yet-china-in-mind/1232207/

Indian conventional forces: You do need huge manpower to win the war in the Himalayas after all winning a war in the mountains is a different game altogether
The total available Indian Army strike forces near China’s border areas are assessed to be around 225,000 personnel. This incorporates the roughly 3,000 personnel attached to a T-90 Bhisma tank brigade stationed in Ladakh and the estimated 1,000 personnel attached to the Brahmos cruise missile regiment in Arunachal Pradesh. For the Army, this total near China’s border areas is divided into about 34,000 troops in the Northern Command,15,500 troops in the Central Command and 175,500 troops in the Eastern Command
The Indian Air Force has an estimated 270 fighters and 68 ground attack aircraft across its three China-facing commands. It is also expanding its network of Advanced Landing Grounds (ALGs), which constitute small air bases in forward locations to provide staging grounds and logistics hubs for aircraft strike missions.
In the Western Air Command, the IAF possesses around 75 fighters and 34 ground attack aircraft, besides 5 ALGs close to Chinese Tibetan areas. The Central Air Command features around 94 fighters, 34 ground attack aircraft, and one ALG. The Eastern Air Command hosts around 101 fighters and 9 ALGs. Crucially, the IA and IAF forces described above are all permanently close to China’s border, shortening their mobilization time and limiting the prospects of a successful Chinese cross-border advance

Chinese conventional forces: There is a total of 200,00-230,000 Chinese ground forces under the Western Theater Command, and Tibet and Xinjiang Military Districts. However, this apparent numerical near-equivalence with that of Indian regional ground forces is misleading. Even in a war with India, a significant proportion of these forces will be unavailable, reserved either for Russian taskings or for countering insurrection in Xinjiang and Tibet. The majority of forces are located further from the Indian border, posing a striking contrast with the majority of forward-deployed Indian forces with a single China defense mission. The new joint Western Theater Command is estimated to hold around 90,000-120,000 troops, principally divided into the 76th and 77th Group Armies. These Group Armies are headquartered towards the interior of Western China, in Chongqing and Baoji respectively. Because of ongoing unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang, the Western Theater Command’s ground operational authority does not extend to these regions. Instead, a special PLA Army-directed Military District has been created for each of these regions. In Tibet, the region closest to Indian border areas, the PLA presence is judged to number just 40,000 troops. More numerous forces are located in the Xinjiang region north of Tibet, totaling around 70,000. This means that China is regularly operating with a permanent Indian conventional force advantage along its border areas. In the event of a major standoff or conflict with India, it would have to rely upon mobilization primarily from Xinjiang and secondarily from the Western Theater Command forces deeper in China’s interior. By contrast, Indian forces are already largely in position. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) also suffers from a numerical disparity to the IAF in the border region. Unlike the tripartite organizational division of Chinese ground forces facing India, the Western Theater Command has assumed control of all regional strike aircraft. In total, this amounts to around 157 fighters and a varied drone armory. This includes an estimated 20 GJ-1/WD-1K precision strike UAVs, 12 WD-1 ground attack and reconnaissance UAVs, 12 WD-1 precision strike UAVs, and 8 EA-03 reconnaissance and electronic warfare UAVs. A proportion of these are reserved for Russia-centric missions. By comparison, as noted earlier, the Indian Eastern Air Command can field around 101 fighters against China alone. China also uses eight airbases and airfields relevant to India strike missions, although a majority are civilian airports that can be commandeered in wartime. Other comparative weaknesses permeate the PLAAF’s posture against India. On a strict comparison of available 4th generation fighters, authoritative assessments hold that China’s J-10 fighter is technically comparable to India’s Mirage-2000, and that the Indian Su-30MKI is superior to all theater Chinese fighters, including the additional J-11 and Su-27 models. China hosts a total of around 101 4th-generation fighters in the theater, of which a proportion must be retained for Russian defense, while India has around 122 of its comparable models, solely directed at China. The high altitude of Chinese air bases in Tibet and Xinjiang, plus the generally difficult geographic and weather conditions of the region, means that Chinese fighters are limited to carrying around half their design payload and fuel. In-flight refueling would be required for PLAAF forces to maximize their strike capacity. China had only inducted 15 such tanker aircraft nationally as of 2022, meaning only a handful of its forces will benefit from this solution. Against these underpowered fighters, IAF forces will launch from bases and airfields unaffected by these geographic conditions, with maximum payload and fuel capabilities. The most significant PLAAF forward air bases and airfields near Indian border areas—which will be pivotal in combat operations—are located at Hotan, Lhasa/Gonggar, Ngari-Gunsa, and Xigaze. Each hosts regular PLAAF detachments, and these are the nearest facilities to Indian targets in Kashmir, northern India, and northeast India. They are vulnerable to a dedicated Indian offensive. Ngari-Gunsa and Xigaze reportedly have no hardened shelters or blast pens for their aircraft, which sit in the open.Lhasa/Gonggar has recently developed hardened shelters able to protect up to 36 aircraft, while Hotan reportedly hosts “two aircraft shelters” of unknown capacity. An Indian early initiative to destroy or incapacitate these four bases—and achieve air superiority over them—would compel China to rely more upon aircraft from its rear-area bases, exacerbating its limited fuel and payload problems. Moreover, China lacks the redundancy and related force survivability compared to India in their comparative numbers of regional air bases. In sum, India has a stronger regional air position, with “a large number of airfields in the east and west, so even if some airfields are down, operations can continue from other locations.
Experience shortcomings that are not shared by the IAF amplify China’s air disadvantage. Recent PLAAF exercises with unscripted scenarios have found that pilots are excessively reliant upon ground control for tactical direction. In unanticipated combat scenarios, this dependence on explicit control tower guidance becomes extreme, while “ground commands” are simultaneously often unable to keep up with the complex and changeable air situation.

This suggests that PLAAF combat proficiency may be significantly weaker than often estimated. Progressive base hardening in the eastern US-facing PLAAF facilities has reduced this risk in that area. A lack of similar measures in the India-facing west suggests that Indian destruction or temporary incapacitation of some of the four above air bases would further exacerbate these PLAAF operational inflexibilities and weaknesses. Recognizing this dilemma, instead of a regional aircraft offensive, Chinese strategic planners envision early long-range missile strikes against Indian air bases in the event of conflict. However, India benefits from the greater number and redundancy of regional air bases, and the daunting number of Chinese missiles that would be required to truly incapacitate relevant IAF forces. High number of disparate targets per air base, the requirement for at least two missiles per target, and the ability of base officials to repave the blast crater with quick-drying concrete within six hours, has articulated the operational problem: To keep one airfield shut for 24 hours, the PLAAF will require 220 ballistic missiles. This will not make any difference to IAF operations in the east or in the west since the IAF has a large number of other operational airfields to operate from. If the PLAAF attacks just three airfields, it will require 660 ballistic missiles per day for attacking the runway and taxi track alone. China’s stock of 1,000-1,200 MRBMs/SRBMs will be over in less than two days when attacking just three airfields, with no other major target systems like C2 centres or air defence units being addressed. India began its process of integrating runway replacement fiberglass mats into its base defense systems, meaning it was likely calculated. However, India is presently inducting these fiberglass mats and associated paving equipment, which will further reduce its runway reconstitution timeframe.It is therefore unlikely that the numerous PLAAF disadvantages detailed above can be overcome by China’s superior missile forces. This is critical beyond the air competition itself: In any India China conflict, the PLA cannot launch an attack without the support of the PLAAF.To address its force shortfalls in the event of war, China could surge air and ground forces from its interior toward the border. However, what our analysis suggests is that the IAF’s superiority would mean that critical logistical routes—such as air bases and military road and rail links—could be cut by bombing or standoff missile strikes, limiting the extent to which China’s position could be reinforced. Such a Chinese surge would also attract attention from the United States, which would alert India and enable it to counter-mobilize its own additional forces from its interior.
A country that has 800,000 armed personnel just to keep a check on civilians in Kashmir valley does not seem very brave.
 
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A country that has 800,000 armed personnel just to keep a check on civilians in Kashmir valley does not seem very brave.
A made up number with no basis at all, only being used by radicals abroad and at home to peddle false propaganda against india. In kashmir valley there is a single corps, i.e, the XV corps with 2 divisions both of which are posted on the LoC permanently, internal security is mainained by some 60 RR battalions. The total combined army strength can't be more than 120,000 indian army soldiers in kashmir valley
 
A made up number with no basis at all, only being used by radicals abroad and at home to peddle false propaganda against india. In kashmir valley there is a single corps, i.e, the XV corps with 2 divisions both of which are posted on the LoC permanently, internal security is mainained by some 60 RR battalions. The total combined army strength can't be more than 120,000 indian army soldiers in kashmir valley
I am a Kashmiri by the way. Do not tell me these facts. I know better than you.
 
Then India is much more than that. The illegal occupation and annexation of Kasmir and adjacent areas,
No nation in the world recognises it as an illgeal occupation. The UN calls it disputed territory.
the illegal annexation of Junagadh and Manavadar ( which are Pakistani territories btw), and similar other examples in the North.
Junagadh was inside the heartland of gujarat away from the **** border. There's no geographical sense to your claim nor do the demographics there support your nonsensical and delusional claim there.
India never accepted Pakistan and always tried to destabilize it. They did their best by supporting all the terrorist activities in Pakistan.
Pakistan took the invitative for the same in 47 by sending tribal raiders to kashmir. Then again in 65 by launching operation Gibraltar, and when india retaliated you cried foul.
India has issues with all of its neighbors including tiny Bhutan and Srilanka. Keep bullying its neighbors.
Same is true for pakistan and china.
India always wanted Pakistan back (Mahabharat, right).
Why are you crying now?
Mahabharata is about the victory of good over evil. In my eyes the Pakistani common man is the same as me but your establishment and army is rotten to the core, they are a bunch of evil crooks

I am a Kashmiri by the way. Do not tell me these facts. I know better than you.
As someone who has been very closely attached to ground realities in kashmir and elsewhere, I'd rather request you to listen to facts and not jingoism.

I am a Kashmiri by the way. Do not tell me these facts. I know better than you.

@TopGun786
Here is the organization of northern command troops in kashmir valley
XIV corps
1) 19 Mountain division
2) 20th mountain division
3) Victor force
4) kilo force
2 of these formations are regular divisons tasked to safeguard LoC and the other two are RR forces attatched to the XV corps. Adding up all of them dosent add up-to more than 120,000 troops
 
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No nation in the world recognises it as an illgeal occupation. The UN calls it disputed territory.

Junagadh was inside the heartland of gujarat away from the **** border. There's no geographical sense to your claim nor do the demographics there support your nonsensical and delusional claim there.

Pakistan took the invitative for the same in 47 by sending tribal raiders to kashmir. Then again in 65 by launching operation Gibraltar, and when india retaliated you cried foul.

Same is true for pakistan and china.

Mahabharata is about the victory of good over evil. In my eyes the Pakistani common man is the same as me but your establishment and army is rotten to the core, they are a bunch of evil crooks



As someone who has been very closely attached to ground realities in kashmir and elsewhere, I'd rather request you to listen to facts and not jingoism.



@TopGun786
Here is the organization of northern command troops in kashmir valley
XIV corps
1) 19 Mountain division
2) 20th mountain division
3) Victor force
4) kilo force
2 of these formations are regular divisons tasked to safeguard LoC and the other two are RR forces attatched to the XV corps. Adding up all of them dosent add up-to more than 120,000 troops
Keep writing. And sorry there was a typo from my side.... it is not 8 lacs Endian Army there in IOK, it is actually 9 lacs. The genocide we have suffered since 1947/48 still will not dampen our wish to separate from a land grabber like India. You keep stealing our resources but until when? Your time is near.
 
Whenever Indian forces meet Chinese forces. The result will always be humiliation of the Indian forces. I would advise India just to mind their own business because China doesn't play around. The more you act up, the harsher the reaction will become. Only thing stopping from China from total humiliation of Indian forces is due to the fact that China profits in the hundreds of billions in trade with India and is the dumping ground for all goods that US/EU don't want. China doesn't want war but will react harshly if pushed.
 
Keep writing. And sorry there was a typo from my side.... it is not 8 lacs Endian Army there in IOK, it is actually 9 lacs.
What's your source ? Where's the breakdown of units and formations deployed in that area ? I gave you a comprehensive breakdown of units in the kashmir valley. Just so you know, india shares LoC with pak which is 780km in length , apart from that india also has a border of 15,000 kms with multiple nations including a 4000km border with china and has 1.2 million troops to cover all of this. There's a heavy military presence in areas like Arunachal pradesh, sikkim,ladakh, Rajasthan, etc. Do you think that if we keep 9 lac soldiers in kashmir then we can defend order sectors of our border ?
The genocide we have suffered since 1947/48 still will not dampen our wish to separate from a land grabber like India.
Keep struggling for a lost cause like you have been since 1989. It's your loss ,not ours. Indian army kills 5 times more terrorists than the number of soldiers it losses. There is simply no way that militants can defeat Indian military there, it's impossible. If you keep your rubbish radical ideology aside and open your hearts and minds to an era of economic development and prosperity then it's you who is going to get the benefits. Focus on making profits out of apparel, walnut, apple and saffron sales, in the last few years we have also seen new factories coming up in the valley thanks to the peace and stability which has been established by the indian army and police.
You keep stealing our resources but until when? Your time is near.
India was at it's lowest in the 90s. India of 2022 is far stronger than india of 1990 with much greater resources, better weapons, better technology and a much larger economy . If you couldn't defeat us back then what makes you think you could do it now ? There was a time when 10,000 terrorists operated in kashmir including hardcore insurgents who were afghan war veterans, today there are barely 200 left most of whom are young teenagers blackmailed and coerced into joining militant outfits for monetary gains. These militants don't have a strong will like the ones army faced in the 90s. They surrender or get killed within a few minutes of engagement.
 
What's your source ? Where's the breakdown of units and formations deployed in that area ? I gave you a comprehensive breakdown of units in the kashmir valley. Just so you know, india shares LoC with pak which is 780km in length , apart from that india also has a border of 15,000 kms with multiple nations including a 4000km border with china and has 1.2 million troops to cover all of this. There's a heavy military presence in areas like Arunachal pradesh, sikkim,ladakh, Rajasthan, etc. Do you think that if we keep 9 lac soldiers in kashmir then we can defend order sectors of our border ?

Keep struggling for a lost cause like you have been since 1989. It's your loss ,not ours. Indian army kills 5 times more terrorists than the number of soldiers it losses. There is simply no way that militants can defeat Indian military there, it's impossible. If you keep your rubbish radical ideology aside and open your hearts and minds to an era of economic development and prosperity then it's you who is going to get the benefits. Focus on making profits out of apparel, walnut, apple and saffron sales, in the last few years we have also seen new factories coming up in the valley thanks to the peace and stability which has been established by the indian army and police.

India was at it's lowest in the 90s. India of 2022 is far stronger than india of 1990 with much greater resources, better weapons, better technology and a much larger economy . If you couldn't defeat us back then what makes you think you could do it now ? There was a time when 10,000 terrorists operated in kashmir including hardcore insurgents who were afghan war veterans, today there are barely 200 left most of whom are young teenagers blackmailed and coerced into joining militant outfits for monetary gains. These militants don't have a strong will like the ones army faced in the 90s. They surrender or get killed within a few minutes of engagement.
Keep talking. I love it.
A much stronger India lost some additional territory in Ladakh to the Chinese plus 2 fighter Jets (Mig21 & SU30MKI), from Pakistan plus a heli with 6 personnel which was actually shot by an AMRAAM 120c but both sides decided to remain silent as matters could have escalated further. A much improved India still facing humiliation from a much weaker Pakistan and a much stronger China. The bubble of the Indian Army will blow in the next conflict (just remember my words).
 
Keep talking. I love it.
A much stronger India lost some additional territory in Ladakh to the Chinese plus 2 fighter Jets (Mig21 & SU30MKI), from Pakistan plus a heli with 6 personnel which was actually shot by an AMRAAM 120c but both sides decided to remain silent as matters could have escalated further. A much improved India still facing humiliation from a much weaker Pakistan and a much stronger China. The bubble of the Indian Army will blow in the next conflict (just remember my words).
I get it. I'm just talking to a retarded 12 yr old who has no military knowledge nor does he have any interest in being corrected if proved wrong. You're not capable of comprehending logic. I pity you
 
Yes yes, keep talking. I like it.
@retaxis @Hellfire2006
If you see the chain of places where the negotiations have been carried out over the last two and a half years, Patrolling Point 15 is one more centerpiece in the whole chain which runs through the Y junction on Raki Nalla, Galwan river (PP14), Patrolling Point 15, PP 17 Alpha, Pangong Tso north and Pangong Tso south bank.

This is a chain of locations which provide access towards Aksai Chin and the Depsang Bulge.

These are areas where buffer zones have developed between the Indian Army and the People's Liberation Army.

Patrolling Point 15 is a pass on the ridge line. The pass is called Jianan La.

By climbing the pass up PP 15, Indian troops can reach the depth areas of the Galwan river, and also get access towards the Depsang Bulge.

Therefore, the PLA wanted to deny or stop the movement of our troops in this area. That is why in my opinion, it took such a long time to finally arrive at a consensus for the creation of the buffer zone at PP15.

The troops of both sides have disengaged from PP15.

The buffer zone means that Indian troops will not patrol to the end of PP15 and the Chinese will not come towards PP15.

As we have seen, it took a long and difficult negotiation because the 16th round of talks took place on July 17. It took 50 days to decide on the buffer zone.

Indian troops posed a threat to the PLA if they had crossed PP15. Hence, it would have been painful for the PLA to allow Indian troops to patrol up to PP15.

The same thing is true at other friction points. We were patrolling up to Finger 8 earlier, we are not any longer. The Chinese are also patrolling up to Finger 4, they too can't patrol up to this area.

At each one of these buffer zones, both forces have distanced and disentangled themselves. So instead of a Line of Actual Control, a sort of 'belt of actual control' has come into being, but this does not provide a settlement to the border dispute.
We have a post in PP3 - Dhan Singh Post- but we didn't have a post in Finger 4 or Finger 8.

We did not have permanent posts in areas of Raki Nala, PP10, 11, 12 or 13, but went for patrols to those areas and the Chinese used to also patrol up to the area of Burtse which they claim as in the 1959 claim line.

So by creating this so-called 'belt of control' or buffer zones, neither are we able to patrol the areas we were patrolling earlier nor the Chinese are able to patrol the areas they were patrolling

It is a denial on both sides. A no win situation and that is where the situation rests now.

This PP15 buffer zone has pushed Indian troops a little away while the PLA has pulled back similarly, thus creating a safe zone. It may suit the Chinese who do not want fisticuffs, brawls and scuffles that used to take place regularly for years.

Our troops used to patrol up to this area and have a look around. The PLA used to also patrol the area.

In the long term analysis, it may give PLA some satisfaction of having achieved a buffer zone protecting their own troops from the fisticuffs and scuffles. But they have also pushed us away from the patrolling areas.

It's a no win situation for either side
 
@retaxis @Hellfire2006
If you see the chain of places where the negotiations have been carried out over the last two and a half years, Patrolling Point 15 is one more centerpiece in the whole chain which runs through the Y junction on Raki Nalla, Galwan river (PP14), Patrolling Point 15, PP 17 Alpha, Pangong Tso north and Pangong Tso south bank.

This is a chain of locations which provide access towards Aksai Chin and the Depsang Bulge.

These are areas where buffer zones have developed between the Indian Army and the People's Liberation Army.

Patrolling Point 15 is a pass on the ridge line. The pass is called Jianan La.

By climbing the pass up PP 15, Indian troops can reach the depth areas of the Galwan river, and also get access towards the Depsang Bulge.

Therefore, the PLA wanted to deny or stop the movement of our troops in this area. That is why in my opinion, it took such a long time to finally arrive at a consensus for the creation of the buffer zone at PP15.

The troops of both sides have disengaged from PP15.

The buffer zone means that Indian troops will not patrol to the end of PP15 and the Chinese will not come towards PP15.

As we have seen, it took a long and difficult negotiation because the 16th round of talks took place on July 17. It took 50 days to decide on the buffer zone.

Indian troops posed a threat to the PLA if they had crossed PP15. Hence, it would have been painful for the PLA to allow Indian troops to patrol up to PP15.

The same thing is true at other friction points. We were patrolling up to Finger 8 earlier, we are not any longer. The Chinese are also patrolling up to Finger 4, they too can't patrol up to this area.

At each one of these buffer zones, both forces have distanced and disentangled themselves. So instead of a Line of Actual Control, a sort of 'belt of actual control' has come into being, but this does not provide a settlement to the border dispute.
We have a post in PP3 - Dhan Singh Post- but we didn't have a post in Finger 4 or Finger 8.

We did not have permanent posts in areas of Raki Nala, PP10, 11, 12 or 13, but went for patrols to those areas and the Chinese used to also patrol up to the area of Burtse which they claim as in the 1959 claim line.

So by creating this so-called 'belt of control' or buffer zones, neither are we able to patrol the areas we were patrolling earlier nor the Chinese are able to patrol the areas they were patrolling

It is a denial on both sides. A no win situation and that is where the situation rests now.

This PP15 buffer zone has pushed Indian troops a little away while the PLA has pulled back similarly, thus creating a safe zone. It may suit the Chinese who do not want fisticuffs, brawls and scuffles that used to take place regularly for years.

Our troops used to patrol up to this area and have a look around. The PLA used to also patrol the area.

In the long term analysis, it may give PLA some satisfaction of having achieved a buffer zone protecting their own troops from the fisticuffs and scuffles. But they have also pushed us away from the patrolling areas.

It's a no win situation for either side
The other guy is silent now. It is your turn to talk now. We saw how the Chinese again recently battered you. Pictures and videos are available everywhere. Meanwhile, you have nothing to prove except the fake chest-thumping.
 
The other guy is silent now. It is your turn to talk now. We saw how the Chinese again recently battered you. Pictures and videos are available everywhere. Meanwhile, you have nothing to prove except the fake chest-thumping.



 
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