What's new

The Kashmir Resolutions - Explanations

You know, I am not sure if you know the breathe of my knowledge on this subject. So PLEASE, try not to take me as a fool. I've studied your region for 3 decades, I know stuff like you don't know your India's history. I am actually meaning every word I say.

They are not allowing to built a "Pandits" Colony? India didn't allow 91% POPULATION's RIGHT TO VOTE when India overtook Kashmir. Do you think you have have a 1% comparison here to your "not letting them build a Pandits colony" case????

How do you overwrite 91% of a state's population's voting right and call yourself a "democratic India"???? The Kashmir is an issue, and it is where it is today due to India not respecting the 91% populations voting right in the elections before the occupation.

How does ONE King (a Hindu Maharaja), overwrite 91% of his population's right to chose their government, and calls his Hindu affiliated state to take over his state and kill all voting and democracy rights and its been the case since 1948?????? Had you people let the REAL Kashmiri's vote, today, Kashmir would be a bridge between Pakistan and India to establish peace. One of the gorgeous places for both the countries tourists to visit and enjoy, meet each other and have great people to people relationships. And, there wouldn't be these so many wars, terrorism and all the drama going on for 70 years. ALL because the rights of the people weren't respected!!!!

There were no referendums in any princely state in either India or Pakistan except in Junagarh. By that logic Bahawalpur should also be disputed territory - it was a princely state and the process of integration was not democratic?

Also, what happened in Balochistan? Can you enlighten us please, oh fountain of all knowledge about our region?

Yes, you can count this as having accepted your challenge. Let us discuss DEMOCRACY.
 
There were no referendums in any princely state in either India or Pakistan except in Junagarh. By that logic Bahawalpur should also be disputed territory - it was a princely state and the process of integration was not democratic?

Also, what happened in Balochistan? Can you enlighten us please, oh fountain of all knowledge about our region?

Yes, you can count this as having accepted your challenge. Let us discuss DEMOCRACY.

Looks like not only you skipped your history classes you also never bothered to read history on internet. That is the reason that I can think of this garbage post.
 
Lets see, lessons ... Make sure you have well established logistical lines of support to the front lines and that the opposing side should not be given an excuse to escalate a localized conflict into full war. In India and Pakistan's situation, the trigger would almost always be occupation of territory that is currently administered by the other.

So check, check and check in terms of 'lessons learned'.


Because we were anticipating your whiny tantrums and media hysteria about 'PAKISTAN USING 120MM MORTARS FOR THE FIRST TIME BLAH BLAH BLAH WA WA WA!'


Under Modi 'winning' is represented by the ability to issue, and amount of, jingoistic statements and threats to double, nay triple, nay quadruple kinetic responses from the Indian military, for Modi fans at least.

So long as Modi or some BJP minister issues random statements, in a thundering, confident and aggressive voice about how 'Pakistan has been taught a lesson it will never forget', the BJP fan-base will be content.

They ignore the obvious issue that this is the umpteenth 'lesson that Pakistan will never forget' statement issued by various BJP ministers since they came into power. I mean, was it meant to be a whole lecture series that is still going on?



What happened in Bahawalpur? The ruler was favorably disposed towards Pakistan and acceded to Pakistan. Kalat's ruler took some more convincing but eventually he officially acceded to Pakistan as well, despite Afghanistan's involvement in stoking terrorism/insurgency in Kalat around that time.

Also, the Indian government has made repeated international commitments to hold a referendum in J&K, several as part of her commitment to implement the UNSC Resolutions on J&K, so attempting analogies between Bahawalpur/Kalat and J&K is a flawed exercise from the outset.

Yes, the ruler of Bahawalpur was favourably disposed towards Pak, just as Hari Singh became after he realized what Pak Army regulars dressed as tribesman were doing to his state. So if favourable disposition is the yardstick then let it be so.

What did India agree to in '48? In Part III of the UN resolution it says that the future of J&K will be decided according to the will of the people. But the very next part of the sentence says that it is rests upon the acceptance of the truce agreement. Part IIA1 clearly states that since the presence of Pakistani troops in J&K constitutes a material change in the situation, Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops. Part IIA2 further states that Pakistan will try its best to ensure that tribesmen and Pak nationals withdraw from Kashmir. Pakistan has, to date, done neither of the two. The UN resolution cannot be enforced till Pakistan does what it is obligated to do under the resolution. The ball was always in our court. It is just that we never chose to see it that way.

The chronology of the resolution clearly depicts that our own obligations, which we never fulfilled, came first. Everything else was contingent upon that. Our best case scenario is agreeing that after all these years it doesn't matter and accept the LOC as the final resolution.

By the way, the resolution also implicitly shows that the Pakistani government had lied about the role of the Pak army in the entire episode. Why do we hold others to a yardstick which we ourselves are not bound by?

Looks like not only you skipped your history classes you also never bothered to read history on internet. That is the reason that I can think of this garbage post.

Rubbish, rubbish, rubbish...there, I said it thrice. Surely I win!!!

India's history books say otherwise, and so do most neutral accounts, you should read more.
 
Rubbish, rubbish, rubbish...there, I said it thrice. Surely I win!!!

India's history books say otherwise, and so do most neutral accounts, you should read more.

I have read history and unlike you I have read it from neutral sources. What you have said above is nothing but garbage and is flawed since you like bharatis have presented a half poorly cropped version of history.

Your comparison of Bahawalpur and Khan of Kalat is bogus since both of them weren't committing a genocide of their own people when they signed accession to Pakistan. As for your bullsh!t claim that Pakistan needs to withdraw troops from AJK to fulfill requirement of UN resolutions since it was India itself that allowed Pakistan to keep troops in AJK as per Karachi agreement.

So if you really are not a bharati hiding behind Pakistani and Chinese flags and want to talk about history then start your history with events that happened before tribal invasion of Kashmir since without that history would be incomplete and your comparisons with Bahawalpur and Baluchistan would be illogical and nonsense since state sponsored genocides didn't happen in those states.

Keep this in mind in case in you think you are some expert on history. What you are presenting are famous bharati lies and we have comprehensive counters for all of them. And also change your flags. We already have had enough of you bharati false flaggers.
 
I have read history and unlike you I have read it from neutral sources. What you have said above is nothing but garbage and is flawed since you like bharatis have presented a half poorly cropped version of history.

Your comparison of Bahawalpur and Khan of Kalat is bogus since both of them weren't committing a genocide of their own people when they signed accession to Pakistan. As for your bullsh!t claim that Pakistan needs to withdraw troops from AJK to fulfill requirement of UN resolutions since it was India itself that allowed Pakistan to keep troops in AJK as per Karachi agreement.

So if you really are not a bharati hiding behind Pakistani and Chinese flags and want to talk about history then start your history with events that happened before tribal invasion of Kashmir since without that history would be incomplete and your comparisons with Bahawalpur and Baluchistan would be illogical and nonsense since state sponsored genocides didn't happen in those states.

Keep this in mind in case in you think you are some expert on history. What you are presenting are famous bharati lies and we have comprehensive counters for all of them. And also change your flags. We already have had enough of you bharati false flaggers.

A3 and B1 of Karachi Agreement clearly state that it applies to Part I of the UN resolution, and not Part II; in fact Part III, which we base all our claims upon, is not even mentioned in the Agreement. You are selectively mentioning parts to suit your purpose. I don't make silly claims like being an expert - it is much easier to refute distortions with facts.

A3 and B1 of Karachi Agreement clearly state that it applies to Part I of the UN resolution, and not Part II; in fact Part III, which we base all our claims upon, is not even mentioned in the Agreement. You are selectively mentioning parts to suit your purpose. I don't make silly claims like being an expert - it is much easier to refute distortions with facts.

As for genocide, who is to decide that? Many people consider Baluchistan to be a classic example thereof. I don't think our decades long fake moral high ground fools or convinces anyone in the world any longer, except the same fanatics who are vilified in this very forum when they attack Pakistan in their violent frenzy.

Fact of the matter is that both Kashmir and Baluchistan has been militarily occupied, they cannot exist as independent entities, and the people there don't really have much of a worldview to understand their own significance. Both places have been reduced to economic oblivion by violence and isolation, and the central government in both countries is now forced to subsidize their existence, despite the enormous economic potential. If anyone can point out any major reason as to why we keep silent on the Baloch issue and jump up and down on a daily basis about Kashmir, I will stand corrected.

It is not that the contributors in this forum are fools, One can easily observe that there are several intelligent, well-read and well-meaning people who post here. Most of them are fully conversant with what our Army has done in Balochistan. But I guess too many of us have been co-opted into this culture of lies and deceit, maybe unwittingly. This has gone on for far too long.
 
Yes, the ruler of Bahawalpur was favourably disposed towards Pak, just as Hari Singh became after he realized what Pak Army regulars dressed as tribesman were doing to his state. So if favourable disposition is the yardstick then let it be so.
Sure, and the rulers of Bahawalpur and Kalat offically acceded to Pakistan, but unlike India and J&K, there was no international commitment to conduct a plebiscite as part of UNSC Resolutions recognizing J&K as an international territorial dispute between 2 parties. So again, there is no analogy to be made between Kalat/Bahawalpur and J&K.
What did India agree to in '48? In Part III of the UN resolution it says that the future of J&K will be decided according to the will of the people. But the very next part of the sentence says that it is rests upon the acceptance of the truce agreement. Part IIA1 clearly states that since the presence of Pakistani troops in J&K constitutes a material change in the situation, Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops. Part IIA2 further states that Pakistan will try its best to ensure that tribesmen and Pak nationals withdraw from Kashmir. Pakistan has, to date, done neither of the two. The UN resolution cannot be enforced till Pakistan does what it is obligated to do under the resolution. The ball was always in our court. It is just that we never chose to see it that way.
The only unilateral requirement placed upon Pakistan is that of ensuring the withdrawal of Pakistani tribesmen. Section 2(A) of UNSC Resolution 47 then places a simultaneous condition upon India (once the process of withdrawal of tribesmen has been confirmed):

2. The Government of India should:
(a) When it is established to the satisfaction of the Commission set up in accordance with the Council's resolution 39 (1948) that the tribesmen are withdrawing and that arrangements for the cessation of the fighting have become effective, put into operation in consultation with the Commission a plan for withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducing them progressively to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order;

Pakistan has fulfilled the unilateral requirements placed upon it by UNSC Resolution 47 - the tribesmen have been withdrawn - the requirement of 'withdrawal of Pakistani Nationals not resident in the State' does not have to be fulfilled until the requirement placed upon India of developing a plan of withdrawal of her forces with the UN commission is fulfilled.

What has not occurred, despite subsequent resolutions and multiple UNSC Commissions and Rapporteurs appointed to negotiate between India and Pakistan, is that 'Indian plan for withdrawing their own forces from J&K'. That plan had to be agreed upon and put in place once the process of withdrawal of tribesmen had been confirmed (not completed). The process of withdrawal of tribesmen was completed decades ago, and India has constantly played the role of an obstructionist and refused to agree to any feasible withdrawal plan proposed by Pakistan or the UN Commissions and Rapporteurs appointed by the UNSC.

The ball is in India's court, in terms of taking the next steps to fulfill the requirements of the UNSC Resolutions on Kashmir.
 
Sure, and the rulers of Bahawalpur and Kalat offically acceded to Pakistan, but unlike India and J&K, there was no international commitment to conduct a plebiscite as part of UNSC Resolutions recognizing J&K as an international territorial dispute between 2 parties. So again, there is no analogy to be made between Kalat/Bahawalpur and J&K.

The only unilateral requirement placed upon Pakistan is that of ensuring the withdrawal of Pakistani tribesmen. Section 2(A) of UNSC Resolution 47 then places a simultaneous condition upon India (once the process of withdrawal of tribesmen has been confirmed):

2. The Government of India should:
(a) When it is established to the satisfaction of the Commission set up in accordance with the Council's resolution 39 (1948) that the tribesmen are withdrawing and that arrangements for the cessation of the fighting have become effective, put into operation in consultation with the Commission a plan for withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducing them progressively to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order;

Pakistan has fulfilled the unilateral requirements placed upon it by UNSC Resolution 47 - the tribesmen have been withdrawn - the requirement of 'withdrawal of Pakistani Nationals not resident in the State' does not have to be fulfilled until the requirement placed upon India of developing a plan of withdrawal of her forces with the UN commission is fulfilled.

What has not occurred, despite subsequent resolutions and multiple UNSC Commissions and Rapporteurs appointed to negotiate between India and Pakistan, is that 'Indian plan for withdrawing their own forces from J&K'. That plan had to be agreed upon and put in place once the process of withdrawal of tribesmen had been confirmed (not completed). The process of withdrawal of tribesmen was completed decades ago, and India has constantly played the role of an obstructionist and refused to agree to any feasible withdrawal plan proposed by Pakistan or the UN Commissions and Rapporteurs appointed by the UNSC.

The ball is in India's court, in terms of taking the next steps to fulfill the requirements of the UNSC Resolutions on Kashmir.

I think while you are arguing in good faith, you are missing the woods for the trees.

What you have quoted is but a small part of the conditions for resolution, not the sine qua non. Why I say so? Because it has been Pakistan's position that regardless of the fulfillment of other terms, India must implement the terms that we wish.

I will divide my response into three parts: in the first part I will address the UN Resolution that Pakistanis cite: Resolution 47. In the second part, I will address the resolution dated 13th Aug 1948 of the UN Commission appointed to resolve the Kashmir issue: which Indians keeps citing. In the third part, I will deal with the Karachi Agreement of 1949, which was randomly mentioned by a non-professor in BS in a recent post here.

R47 was intended to be the basis for the dialogue between the two countries, and not the sum of it, as we in Pakistan seem to believe. About the part that you have quoted, yes, it says that once Pakistan removes its nationals and tribesmen, India should proceed with the plebiscite. Now two things happened, Pakistan did not withdraw, and India hardened its stance and said that Pakistani withdrawal is a pre-condition. That part you highlighted, you have understood it wrongly. It did not mean that the non-regulars fighting on the Indian side needed to withdraw. It meant that all Pakistanis withdraw from entire J&K. Of course, our government argued along the same lines as you, which was rejected by the Indians. They said that Pakistan had not complied, so no plebiscite. This confusion became the basis for the second resolution that I will talk about in the next part.
 
I think while you are arguing in good faith, you are missing the woods for the trees.

What you have quoted is but a small part of the conditions for resolution, not the sine qua non. Why I say so? Because it has been Pakistan's position that regardless of the fulfillment of other terms, India must implement the terms that we wish.

I will divide my response into three parts: in the first part I will address the UN Resolution that Pakistanis cite: Resolution 47. In the second part, I will address the resolution dated 13th Aug 1948 of the UN Commission appointed to resolve the Kashmir issue: which Indians keeps citing. In the third part, I will deal with the Karachi Agreement of 1949, which was randomly mentioned by a non-professor in BS in a recent post here.

R47 was intended to be the basis for the dialogue between the two countries, and not the sum of it, as we in Pakistan seem to believe. About the part that you have quoted, yes, it says that once Pakistan removes its nationals and tribesmen, India should proceed with the plebiscite. Now two things happened, Pakistan did not withdraw, and India hardened its stance and said that Pakistani withdrawal is a pre-condition. That part you highlighted, you have understood it wrongly. It did not mean that the non-regulars fighting on the Indian side needed to withdraw. It meant that all Pakistanis withdraw from entire J&K. Of course, our government argued along the same lines as you, which was rejected by the Indians. They said that Pakistan had not complied, so no plebiscite. This confusion became the basis for the second resolution that I will talk about in the next part.
I understand that you are composing the second part of your response, but I need to point out a couple of critical mistakes in your first part before you build upon them in the second and third.

First, I have not claimed that UNSCR 47 is the 'end all' of the UNSC Resolutions on Kashmir. In fact, in prior debates I have referenced UNSCR's passed after 47 far more, since they strengthen the Pakistani position further.

Second, the text of the UNSCR 47 that I highlighted is clear - it references ONLY verification of start of the withdrawal of the tribesmen as a fulfilment of the unilateral requirements placed upon Pakistan, at which point the requirement for India to agree to a plan of withdrawal with the appointed UN Commission has to take place. If the requirement was to 'verify the start of the withdrawal of both tribesmen AND Pakistani Nationals', the language would have mirrored the first paragraph. In addition, the initial reference to 'Pakistan agrees to withdraw its forces' is an acceptance of the principle taht, it is not a time-bound requirement from the UNSC nor is it a time-bound commitment from Pakistan.

Pakistan started and finished the withdrawal of tribesmen, but India never agreed to the various UN Commission and UN rappeurteur proposals on establishing a plan of withdrawal of Indian forces in J&K. The obstructionism and failure to proceed with implementation of the remaining requirements is therefore the responsibility of India.
 
I understand that you are composing the second part of your response, but I need to point out a couple of critical mistakes in your first part before you build upon them in the second and third.

First, I have not claimed that UNSCR 47 is the 'end all' of the UNSC Resolutions on Kashmir. In fact, in prior debates I have referenced UNSCR's passed after 47 far more, since they strengthen the Pakistani position further.

Second, the text of the UNSCR 47 that I highlighted is clear - it references ONLY verification of start of the withdrawal of the tribesmen as a fulfilment of the unilateral requirements placed upon Pakistan, at which point the requirement for India to agree to a plan of withdrawal with the appointed UN Commission has to take place. If the requirement was to 'verify the start of the withdrawal of both tribesmen AND Pakistani Nationals', the language would have mirrored the first paragraph. In addition, the initial reference to 'Pakistan agrees to withdraw its forces' is an acceptance of the principle taht, it is not a time-bound requirement from the UNSC nor is it a time-bound commitment from Pakistan.

Pakistan started and finished the withdrawal of tribesmen, but India never agreed to the various UN Commission and UN rappeurteur proposals on establishing a plan of withdrawal of Indian forces in J&K. The obstructionism and failure to proceed with implementation of the remaining requirements is therefore the responsibility of India.

You are right about the dissonance between 1A and 2A insofar that the words Pakistani Nationals is present in the former but not the latter.

Which brings us to the second part: the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolution dated 13 August 1948. Let me point out that there are several other UN resolutions in this regard, as well as the UN proposals that you have rightly mentioned. The reason I am dealing with this particular resolution is that a) India claims it is the most important resolution as it circumscribes what was vaguely stated in R47 in actual terms, and b) I am yet to find anything in the other resolutions that are responsible for the schism in positions that exist today.

I will deal with the UN Commission resolution dated 13 August 1948 in chronological order. I hope you are able to appreciate my point. The chronological order is important because we cannot simply pick whatever part we feel like to suit our convenience. Each part is conditional upon the implementation of the part preceding it. I guess the UNSC understood us quite well, which is why it mentioned even this basic norm of interpretation within the resolution itself.

Part I is the ceasefire order. Without that, none of the subsequent parts would apply. Both parties implemented that.

Part II deals with the framework within which a valid truce agreement was to be worked out. This is the most important part of the resolution, by the way. IIA1 states that, and I quote "As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State." Notice, it does not say Pakistan is supposed to withdraw its troops from wherever it wants while maintaining positions in whichever part of Kashmir it fancies as its own. It calls for withdrawal from all of J&K.

Secondly, the words Pakistani Nationals that you rightly said were omitted in 2A is now back in. IIA2 states, and I quote “The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting.” It is obvious that the UN had stopped buying our version by then.

Now the important part: IIB1 states, I quote “When the commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals referred to in Part II, A, 2, hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistani forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.” The game had totally changed. There is now an unambiguous requirement on Pakistan’s part to totally withdraw militarily from J&K as a condition precedent for India to act. Pakistan has not withdrawn to this date.

Part III is a watered down re-iteration from R47: "The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end, upon acceptance of the truce agreement, both Governments agree to enter into consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression will be assured." Once again, it is all contingent upon Pakistan withdrawing. Also, note the change in tone - this is a consistent feature throughout. Upon realizing that Pakistan is not going to withdraw and India is not going to act on the plebiscite, the UN is trying to get out of the situation by obfuscating an earlier, clearer position.

I must add here, though, that the resolutions themselves are very poorly drafted. No self-respecting lawyer would allow such inconsistencies, revisions and open-ended language to subsist, especially when the stakes are so high. But then how would they know at that time how high the stakes would eventually become?
 
Now coming to the Karachi Agreement of 1949. I don’t understand how and why Areesh from LaLa Land had his Eureka moment that this is the clincher. And yes, you may go ahead and accuse me of generalizing, but this sort of immature cock talk is typical of our South Asian culture.

The purpose of this agreement was simply to establish a ceasefire line under the on-going dialogue, and nothing else. It is clearly stated in A2: “That the United Nationals Commission for India and Pakistan in its letter stated that "The meeting will be for military purposes; political issues will not be considered," and that "They will be conducted without prejudice to negotiations concerning the truce agreement". Furthermore, A3 states:... "The cease-fire line is a complement of the suspension of hostilities, which falls within the provisions of Part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 and can be considered separately from the questions relating to Part II of the same resolution".

This means, dear Areesh, wild accuser from nowhere, that the demarcation had nothing to do with the conditions stated in Part II of the prior resolution. Please try to wrap your childish conspiratorial head around that one (Agnostic please ignore my ramblings about Areesh, it is not directed at you. I mean only as much harm and malice as he does).

Finally, there is the small matter of binding nature. Now this is an open question actually. Kofi Annan rather casually stated that R47 is not binding as it was under Chapter VI and not Chapter VII of the UN Charter. But in the Namibia Advisory Opinion (1971), the ICJ did opine that all UN resolutions are binding. There is also the reverse case to consider – that all resolutions are non-binding until the US decides otherwise!!!

PS: It is not my case that India has a watertight case and we have none. There is ample evidence that both sides made goof-ups along the way. One can always argue that Pakistan’s official position that the issue should be resolved in terms of all resolutions it deems favourable to itself. The Indians have a similar case. Will the Pakistani Army withdraw from Azaad Kashmir (how is it Azaad in any case?)? If not, then how do we keep a straight face when we say that the Indians should de-escalate, given their historic experience of what we do if there is an insufficient buildup?

We should ask questions of ourselves, instead of pointing fingers all the time.
 
Which brings us to the second part: the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolution dated 13 August 1948. Let me point out that there are several other UN resolutions in this regard, as well as the UN proposals that you have rightly mentioned. The reason I am dealing with this particular resolution is that a) India claims it is the most important resolution as it circumscribes what was vaguely stated in R47 in actual terms, and b) I am yet to find anything in the other resolutions that are responsible for the schism in positions that exist today.
I'm curious as to why one single resolution should be arbitrarily picked and flagged as 'the most important resolution'. As with any dispute, it takes time to investigate and understand the complexities and dynamics involved. Inter-State disputes can be exceedingly complex to understand, so the issuance of multiple UNSC Resolutions and reports is understandable. While I am not outright opposing this choice of the UNCIP Resolution of 13 August 1948, I would like to understand why subsequent and past resolutions and reports cannot be used as references for clarification of the ambiguities see within?
I will deal with the UN Commission resolution dated 13 August 1948 in chronological order. I hope you are able to appreciate my point. The chronological order is important because we cannot simply pick whatever part we feel like to suit our convenience. Each part is conditional upon the implementation of the part preceding it. I guess the UNSC understood us quite well, which is why it mentioned even this basic norm of interpretation within the resolution itself.
I have no major issue with looking at these issues in chronological order, however, you can't compartmentalize blindly because various sections of the resolution (or prior/subsequent resolutions and reports) can offer clarity and context for contentious sections that can be (and have been) interpreted differently by India and Pakistan.

Part I is the ceasefire order. Without that, none of the subsequent parts would apply. Both parties implemented that.

Part II deals with the framework within which a valid truce agreement was to be worked out. This is the most important part of the resolution, by the way.
Before we get into a debate over language of the resolution in Part and differing interpretations, I'd like to point out that the text of UNCIP Resolution on 08/13/48 makes clear that Ceasefire and Truce Agreement steps outlined in Part I and II are proposals - any commitment on the part of India and Pakistan would be part of an actual truce agreement that the 2 countries would negotiate with representatives of the UN. See excerpts below:

THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN
Having given careful consideration to the points of view expressed by the Representatives, of India and Pakistan regarding the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and Being of the opinion that the prompt cessation of hostilities and the correction of conditions the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security are essential to implementation of its endeavours to assist the Governments of India and Pakistan in effecting a final settlement of the situation, Resolves to submit simultaneously to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following proposal:

PART II
TRUCE AGREEMENT
Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part I, both Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the

formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their Representatives and the Commission.

So this particular resolution is nothing more than a set of proposals that the UNCIP put forward for India and Pakistan to consider as part of broader negotiations on an actual agreement on demilitarization of J&K. There was no unilateral requirement for withdrawal of Pakistani military forces placed upon Pakistan here.

I'll respond next to the point that these proposals 'created basic requirements for Pakistan that had to be part of any subsequent Truce Agreement' next.
 
I'm curious as to why one single resolution should be arbitrarily picked and flagged as 'the most important resolution'. As with any dispute, it takes time to investigate and understand the complexities and dynamics involved. Inter-State disputes can be exceedingly complex to understand, so the issuance of multiple UNSC Resolutions and reports is understandable. While I am not outright opposing this choice of the UNCIP Resolution of 13 August 1948, I would like to understand why subsequent and past resolutions and reports cannot be used as references for clarification of the ambiguities see within?

I have no major issue with looking at these issues in chronological order, however, you can't compartmentalize blindly because various sections of the resolution (or prior/subsequent resolutions and reports) can offer clarity and context for contentious sections that can be (and have been) interpreted differently by India and Pakistan.


Before we get into a debate over language of the resolution in Part and differing interpretations, I'd like to point out that the text of UNCIP Resolution on 08/13/48 makes clear that Ceasefire and Truce Agreement steps outlined in Part I and II are proposals - any commitment on the part of India and Pakistan would be part of an actual truce agreement that the 2 countries would negotiate with representatives of the UN. See excerpts below:

THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN
Having given careful consideration to the points of view expressed by the Representatives, of India and Pakistan regarding the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and Being of the opinion that the prompt cessation of hostilities and the correction of conditions the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security are essential to implementation of its endeavours to assist the Governments of India and Pakistan in effecting a final settlement of the situation, Resolves to submit simultaneously to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following proposal:

PART II
TRUCE AGREEMENT
Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part I, both Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the

formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their Representatives and the Commission.

So this particular resolution is nothing more than a set of proposals that the UNCIP put forward for India and Pakistan to consider as part of broader negotiations on an actual agreement on demilitarization of J&K. There was no unilateral requirement for withdrawal of Pakistani military forces placed upon Pakistan here.

I'll respond next to the point that these proposals 'created basic requirements for Pakistan that had to be part of any subsequent Truce Agreement' next.

I think I will wait for your complete reply before addressing it. I would just like to point out one thing: It is not my contention that R47 or UNCIP 13/08/1948 are the only relevant documents. It just happens that the conflict in position draws from these two - Pakistanis cite the former and Indians cite the latter. If you can find another resolution or proposal or even observations from UN rapporteurs that add to our understanding please mention it as well.
 
I think I will wait for your complete reply before addressing it. I would just like to point out one thing: It is not my contention that R47 or UNCIP 13/08/1948 are the only relevant documents. It just happens that the conflict in position draws from these two - Pakistanis cite the former and Indians cite the latter.
I disagree - Pakistan's position is in fact bolstered by reference to the entire gamut of UNSC Resolutions, UNCIP and UN Rapporteur reports. It is the Indian's who have the most to gain by arbitrarily selecting and focusing on one part of one UNCIP Resolution.
If you can find another resolution or proposal or even observations from UN rapporteurs that add to our understanding please mention it as well.
The UNCIP Resolution of 13 August itself has clear language that negates the Indian assertion of an 'unconditional unilateral withdrawal required of Pakistan'.

Part II-A (1) and Part II-A (2) of the UNCIP Resolution make a distinction between 'Pakistani Troops' and 'Tribesmen and Pakistani nationals' and the language uses 'Troops' specifically with the intent of representing Pakistani government forces and the term 'Forces' as representing all combatants, whether under the direct control of either government or not.

This deliberate distinction between 'Troops' and 'tribesmen and Pakistani nationals' is clear from how UNCIP expects the GoP to handle the withdrawals of each. In the case of 'troops' the UNCIP Resolution states that 'the government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops', which is a clear commitment. This makes sense since these are government troops under government control, 'there is no try, just do' (to paraphrase Yoda). In the case of 'tribesmen and Pakistan nationals', however, UNCIP states that 'the GoP will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal'. This also makes sense since the reference is to 'fighting forces' that are not part of the military and possibly composed of independent volunteers, mercenaries etc that the government cannot be expected to completely control.

Second, if UNCIP considered 'Pakistani nationals' and 'troops' to be the same entity, it would not have mentioned them separately in 2 paragraphs committing the exact same 'withdrawal', nor would it have in one case expected a clear commitment of the GoP withdrawing 'troops' and in the other expecting the GoP to 'try its best to withdraw Pakistani nationals'. This distinction, and the addition of a fourth type of combatant, the Azad Kashmir Forces, is further established by the Indian government as part of the proposals she made to Frank Graham which can be seen in his Second Report to the UNSC:

(a) The Indian Government is ready to withdraw the bulk of its army when
(i) the tribesmen, Pakistan nationals not normally resident in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Pakistan troops have been withdrawn from the State;
(ii) large-scale disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces have taken place.

I have hopefully clearly explained how and why the terms 'troops' and 'Pakistan nationals' and 'tribesmen' used in the UNCIP Resolution are not the same. The underlined sections of the UNCIP Resolution supporting my argument are quoted below:

A. (1) As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.

(2) The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting.

(3) Pending a final solution the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.

Now we can proceed to Part II-B - please keep in mind the distinctions between 'troops, Pakistan nationals and tribesmen' that I pointed out above and note the syntax and grammar used in the following excerpt that Indians and their Western apologists, such as that lying hack Christine Fair, like to distort and dissemble in arguing for an unconditional Pakistani withdrawal:

B. (1) When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in Part II A2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.

I've explained how the terms 'tribesmen and Pakistani nationals' are used to represent entities distinct from 'Pakistani troops' in this specific UNCIP resolutions. The section above highlighted in red therefore refers only to 'tribesmen and Pakistani nationals' and not to 'Pakistani troops' or 'government forces'.

The section highlighted in green is the section that refers to Pakistani troops/government forces withdrawal, and it describes said withdrawal in the 'present continuous tense' (being withdrawn) - an event that is 'ongoing and not complete'. And while the process of Pakistani troop/forces being withdrawn is 'ongoing and not complete', UNCIP requires India to 'begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces' (section in blue).

Now, I would expect you to argue that this still means that Pakistan is required to start withdrawing her troops first so India has no responsibilities placed upon her until Pakistan fulfills her commitment of 'starting the withdrawal'. The reason this argument is wrong is because of the last part of the blue highlighted text, "in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission". This is where the introductory paragraph of Part II is significant, and reinforced by Part II-C (1) - see highlighted sections below:

PART II TRUCE AGREEMENT Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part I, both Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their Representatives and the Commission.

C. (1) Upon signature, the full text of the Truce Agreement or communique containing the principles thereof as agreed upon between the two Governments and the Commission, will be made public.

So the critical 'principle that was to be the basis for the formulation of a truce agreement' for India and Pakistan boils down to one line in Part II - B (1), which states that:

"and further, that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission."

India. Pakistan and UNCIP had to come to an agreement on the details of a Truce Agreement that defined the withdrawal plans of both Pakistan AND India, and it isn't as simple as you would think - the phrase 'Pakistani forces are being withdrawn' doesn't detail what percentage of Pakistani forces need to be withdrawn, and the withdrawal verified, before Indian forces started withdrawing. Technically, Pakistan could withdraw a single soldier, or merely load up a truck full of soldiers ready to drive away and be in compliance with the condition of 'Pakistani forces are being withdrawn', which would then require Indian forces to start their withdrawal.

So the withdrawal timelines, numbers and details had to be negotiated in detail, which is where the process fell apart, primarily because of unreasonable demands from the Indian side. Pakistan was willing to pursue almost every reasonable proposal put forward by UN mediators and representatives, even when Pakistan troops would be at a military disadvantage due to significantly lower troop levels compared to the Indians.

Pakistan's position on the UNCIP Resolution of 13 August 1948 is borne out by the McNaughton Report, which was one of the proposals for a truce Agreement based on Part II of the subject UNCIP Resolution:

DEMILITARISATION PREPARATORY TO THE PLEBISCITE 2. There should be an agreed programme of progressive demilitarisation, the basic principle of which should be the reduction of armed forces on either side of the Cease-Fire Line by withdrawal, disbandment and disarmament in such stages as not to cause fear at any point of time to the people on either side of the Cease-Fire Line. The aim should be to reduce the armed personnel in the State of Jammu and Kashmir on both side of the Cease-Fire Line to the minimum compatible with the maintenance of security and of local law and order, and to a level sufficiently low and with the forces so disposed that they will not constitute a restriction on the free expression of opinion for the purposes of the plebiscite. The programme of demilitarisation should include the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of the regular forces of Pakistan; and the withdrawal of the regular forces of India not required for purposes of security or for the maintenance of local law and order on the Indian side of the Cease-Fire Line; also the reduction, by disbanding and disarming, of local forces, including on the one side the Armed Forces and Militia of the State of Kashmir and on the other, the Azad Forces.
And:
(c) Agreement should be reached on the basic principles of demilitarisation outlined in paragraph 2 above.
(d) Agreement should be reached on the minimum forces required for the maintenance of security and of local law and order, and on their general disposition.

The McNaughton report was accepted and endorsed by the UNSC in Resolution 80, 1950:

1. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to make immediate arrangements, without prejudice to their rights or claims and with due regard to the requirements of law and order, to prepare and execute within a period of five months from the date of this resolution a programme of demilitarization on the basis of the principles of paragraph 2 of General McNaughton's proposal7 or of such modifications of those principles as may be mutually agreed;

In conclusion, the simple documented fact that the Indian government participated in every single UNCIP and UNSC appointed rapporteur's mission of negotiating a truce agreement over the process and details of a military withdrawal from J&K is an acceptance of the Pakistani position that the UNSC and UNCIP Resolutions do not require a unilateral and unconditional withdrawal by Pakistani military forces before a plebiscite can be conducted, because if that had even remotely been the case, the Indian Government would have refused to engage in a single UNCIP or UNSC Representatives process of negotiations over the details of a withdrawal.

@Horus @Irfan Baloch @Oscar @Developereo @fatman17 @MastanKhan @Syed.Ali.Haider @MilSpec @Jango@Areesh@genmirajborgza786 @Atanz @Solomon2 @RiazHaq

Please see above and, if you feel like it, offer corrections and/or suggestions to improve and make as complete as possible.
 
I disagree - Pakistan's position is in fact bolstered by reference to the entire gamut of UNSC Resolutions, UNCIP and UN Rapporteur reports. It is the Indian's who have the most to gain by arbitrarily selecting and focusing on one part of one UNCIP Resolution.

The UNCIP Resolution of 13 August itself has clear language that negates the Indian assertion of an 'unconditional unilateral withdrawal required of Pakistan'.

Part II-A (1) and Part II-A (2) of the UNCIP Resolution make a distinction between 'Pakistani Troops' and 'Tribesmen and Pakistani nationals' and the language uses 'Troops' specifically with the intent of representing Pakistani government forces and the term 'Forces' as representing all combatants, whether under the direct control of either government or not.

This deliberate distinction between 'Troops' and 'tribesmen and Pakistani nationals' is clear from how UNCIP expects the GoP to handle the withdrawals of each. In the case of 'troops' the UNCIP Resolution states that 'the government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops', which is a clear commitment. This makes sense since these are government troops under government control, 'there is no try, just do' (to paraphrase Yoda). In the case of 'tribesmen and Pakistan nationals', however, UNCIP states that 'the GoP will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal'. This also makes sense since the reference is to 'fighting forces' that are not part of the military and possibly composed of independent volunteers, mercenaries etc that the government cannot be expected to completely control.

Second, if UNCIP considered 'Pakistani nationals' and 'troops' to be the same entity, it would not have mentioned them separately in 2 paragraphs committing the exact same 'withdrawal', nor would it have in one case expected a clear commitment of the GoP withdrawing 'troops' and in the other expecting the GoP to 'try its best to withdraw Pakistani nationals'. This distinction, and the addition of a fourth type of combatant, the Azad Kashmir Forces, is further established by the Indian government as part of the proposals she made to Frank Graham which can be seen in his Second Report to the UNSC:

(a) The Indian Government is ready to withdraw the bulk of its army when
(i) the tribesmen, Pakistan nationals not normally resident in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Pakistan troops have been withdrawn from the State;
(ii) large-scale disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces have taken place.

I have hopefully clearly explained how and why the terms 'troops' and 'Pakistan nationals' and 'tribesmen' used in the UNCIP Resolution are not the same. The underlined sections of the UNCIP Resolution supporting my argument are quoted below:

A. (1) As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.

(2) The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting.

(3) Pending a final solution the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.

Now we can proceed to Part II-B - please keep in mind the distinctions between 'troops, Pakistan nationals and tribesmen' that I pointed out above and note the syntax and grammar used in the following excerpt that Indians and their Western apologists, such as that lying hack Christine Fair, like to distort and dissemble in arguing for an unconditional Pakistani withdrawal:

B. (1) When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in Part II A2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.

I've explained how the terms 'tribesmen and Pakistani nationals' are used to represent entities distinct from 'Pakistani troops' in this specific UNCIP resolutions. The section above highlighted in red therefore refers only to 'tribesmen and Pakistani nationals' and not to 'Pakistani troops' or 'government forces'.

The section highlighted in green is the section that refers to Pakistani troops/government forces withdrawal, and it describes said withdrawal in the 'present continuous tense' (being withdrawn) - an event that is 'ongoing and not complete'. And while the process of Pakistani troop/forces being withdrawn is 'ongoing and not complete', UNCIP requires India to 'begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces' (section in blue).

Now, I would expect you to argue that this still means that Pakistan is required to start withdrawing her troops first so India has no responsibilities placed upon her until Pakistan fulfills her commitment of 'starting the withdrawal'. The reason this argument is wrong is because of the last part of the blue highlighted text, "in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission". This is where the introductory paragraph of Part II is significant, and reinforced by Part II-C (1) - see highlighted sections below:

PART II TRUCE AGREEMENT Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part I, both Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their Representatives and the Commission.

C. (1) Upon signature, the full text of the Truce Agreement or communique containing the principles thereof as agreed upon between the two Governments and the Commission, will be made public.

So the critical 'principle that was to be the basis for the formulation of a truce agreement' for India and Pakistan boils down to one line in Part II - B (1), which states that:

"and further, that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission."

India. Pakistan and UNCIP had to come to an agreement on the details of a Truce Agreement that defined the withdrawal plans of both Pakistan AND India, and it isn't as simple as you would think - the phrase 'Pakistani forces are being withdrawn' doesn't detail what percentage of Pakistani forces need to be withdrawn, and the withdrawal verified, before Indian forces started withdrawing. Technically, Pakistan could withdraw a single soldier, or merely load up a truck full of soldiers ready to drive away and be in compliance with the condition of 'Pakistani forces are being withdrawn', which would then require Indian forces to start their withdrawal.

So the withdrawal timelines, numbers and details had to be negotiated in detail, which is where the process fell apart, primarily because of unreasonable demands from the Indian side. Pakistan was willing to pursue almost every reasonable proposal put forward by UN mediators and representatives, even when Pakistan troops would be at a military disadvantage due to significantly lower troop levels compared to the Indians.

Pakistan's position on the UNCIP Resolution of 13 August 1948 is borne out by the McNaughton Report, which was one of the proposals for a truce Agreement based on Part II of the subject UNCIP Resolution:

DEMILITARISATION PREPARATORY TO THE PLEBISCITE 2. There should be an agreed programme of progressive demilitarisation, the basic principle of which should be the reduction of armed forces on either side of the Cease-Fire Line by withdrawal, disbandment and disarmament in such stages as not to cause fear at any point of time to the people on either side of the Cease-Fire Line. The aim should be to reduce the armed personnel in the State of Jammu and Kashmir on both side of the Cease-Fire Line to the minimum compatible with the maintenance of security and of local law and order, and to a level sufficiently low and with the forces so disposed that they will not constitute a restriction on the free expression of opinion for the purposes of the plebiscite. The programme of demilitarisation should include the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of the regular forces of Pakistan; and the withdrawal of the regular forces of India not required for purposes of security or for the maintenance of local law and order on the Indian side of the Cease-Fire Line; also the reduction, by disbanding and disarming, of local forces, including on the one side the Armed Forces and Militia of the State of Kashmir and on the other, the Azad Forces.
And:
(c) Agreement should be reached on the basic principles of demilitarisation outlined in paragraph 2 above.
(d) Agreement should be reached on the minimum forces required for the maintenance of security and of local law and order, and on their general disposition.

The McNaughton report was accepted and endorsed by the UNSC in Resolution 80, 1950:

1. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to make immediate arrangements, without prejudice to their rights or claims and with due regard to the requirements of law and order, to prepare and execute within a period of five months from the date of this resolution a programme of demilitarization on the basis of the principles of paragraph 2 of General McNaughton's proposal7 or of such modifications of those principles as may be mutually agreed;

In conclusion, the simple documented fact that the Indian government participated in every single UNCIP and UNSC appointed rapporteur's mission of negotiating a truce agreement over the process and details of a military withdrawal from J&K is an acceptance of the Pakistani position that the UNSC and UNCIP Resolutions do not require a unilateral and unconditional withdrawal by Pakistani military forces before a plebiscite can be conducted, because if that had even remotely been the case, the Indian Government would have refused to engage in a single UNCIP or UNSC Representatives process of negotiations over the details of a withdrawal.

@Horus @Irfan Baloch @Oscar @Developereo @fatman17 @MastanKhan @Syed.Ali.Haider @MilSpec @Jango@Areesh@genmirajborgza786 @Atanz @Solomon2 @RiazHaq

Please see above and, if you feel like it, offer corrections and/or suggestions to improve and make as complete as possible.

I would like to start with certain preliminary observations:

- Our discussion on this subject is academic as for now, for the reason that ever since Kashmir was removed from the list of disputed territories under UN observation, Pakistan’s claims that it continues to be a disputed territory are based outside the UN framework. Of course, if and when the UN puts Kashmir back on the list, the UN resolutions would come back into the picture.

- You are right in stating that the 13 Aug 1948 resolution was a mere proposal, to be taken forward by both parties. At the same time, Parts A and B of Resolution 47 are also just recommendations, as clearly mentioned in the resolution.

- In any form of negotiated settlement, the mere fact that a party agreed to sit for discussions cannot be held against them. Of course, if the parties have mutually agreed to a framework within which a final settlement is binding on both, then no doubt it is so. In all these negotiations, the fact that India has been a willing party cannot lead to an inference that they must be implicitly agreeable to Pakistan’s position. That is why, before each round of negotiations, it is made clear that the discussions are without prejudice to any other related issue. So, for instance, the fact that both parties agreed to a ceasefire line in 1949 is binding unless they totally abandon the framework, but cannot be held against either to say that means they have implicitly conceded anything to the other side.

- Finally, there is the issue of moral behaviour to be considered. It is an unfortunate precedence established by the US in the Nicaragua Case (ICJ, 1986), that international law is nothing but “might is right.” A country can simply ignore international law if it can afford to do so. Pakistan reserves the right to simply abandon the UN framework altogether if it sees nothing fruitful emerging from the process. Like every sovereign country, it has the right to do what it deems to be in its own self interest. But if it places so much emphasis on the UNSC resolutions, then it cannot place any less emphasis on the emerging UN consensus on the subject. Things have moved on from 1950. Today, Pakistan does not find much support when it raises the Kashmir issue at the UN. There is no realistic chance that it will be able to pressure India on the subject through the UN. Yet, Pakistan is claiming Kashmir is a disputed territory. So basically, Pakistan is pulling a US – harping on prior UNSC resolutions when it is convenient and ignoring the change in the UN position on the issue.

You write:

This deliberate distinction between'Troops'and'tribesmenandPakistani nationals'is clear from how UNCIP expects the GoP to handle the withdrawals of each. In the case of'troops'the UNCIP Resolution states that'the government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops', which is a clear commitment. This makes sense since these are government troops under government control, 'there is no try, just do' (to paraphrase Yoda). In the case of 'tribesmenandPakistan nationals', however, UNCIP states that 'the GoP will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal'. This also makes sense since the reference is to 'fighting forces' that are not part of the military and possibly composed of independent volunteers, mercenaries etc that the government cannot be expected to completely control.

Let us look at why the situation came about. In the initial stages of the conflict, the UN was not privy to accurate information. When India initially took the matter to the UN, India itself was not aware of the extent of involvement of Pakistani troops. Reference India’s original complain dated 01.01.1948:

Indian Complaint to the Security Council, lst January 1948

As a response, our government dutifully lied to the whole world, as it often does, by denying any involvement in the matter. Reference UN Report Chapter VIII pg 344:

http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/46-51/Chapter 8/46-51_08-16-The India-Pakistan question.pdf

This lie was challenged by India, and later exposed due to the very first UNCIP mission in July. Until then, the UN was not sure about the presence of Pakistani troops, just that tribesmen had entered. UN Report Chapter VIII pg 348:

http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/46-51/Chapter 8/46-51_08-16-The India-Pakistan question.pdf

This explains the discrepancy between Resolution 47 and Resolution of Aug 13.

By the way, the distinction you drew about how the UN construed the difference between Pakistani troops and irregulars may be valid, but yet, what are its practical ramifications? You have gotten yourself into a logical bind. I will elaborate on that in the second point.

Pakistan has repeated several times that it has no control over what these irregulars do. In fact, that is the basis for the deadlock. That is the reason why regardless of what conclusion we ever arrive at, India will not de-militarize the Valley. I will come back to that point later.

However, this interesting aside only explains why the UN chose to stop believing anything we had to say, it does not go to the core of the matter. I only mentioned that to explain the discrepancy that you had initially pointed out between the two resolutions. Unfortunately, it’s a blind alley that I also entered despite the fact it has no relevance to the larger issue we are discussing. The dispute derives from the second point of your argument, so let us focus on that.

You write:

I've explained how the terms 'tribesmen and Pakistani nationals' are used to represent entities distinct from 'Pakistani troops' in this specific UNCIP resolutions. The section above highlighted in red therefore refers only to'tribesmen and Pakistani nationals'and not to'Pakistani troops'or'government forces'.

The section highlighted in green is the section that refers to Pakistani troops/government forces withdrawal, and it describes said withdrawal in the 'present continuous tense' (being withdrawn) - an event that is'ongoing and not complete'. And while the process of Pakistani troop/forces being withdrawn is'ongoing and not complete', UNCIP requires India to'begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces'(section in blue).


I am not quoting the rest of the text. Instead, let me paraphrase your contention. What you are trying to say is that the text shows that there was only an obligation to withdraw irregulars, whereas the withdrawal of troops was supposed to be ongoing. You are also contending that the entire process of de-escalation was to be decided as per the details of the Truce agreement that was yet to be drawn up. What you are also contending is that without the said agreement, the quantum of Pakistani/Indian withdrawal could not be ascertained in the first place, therefore, as per the text, it was for India to agree to initiation of withdrawal, thereby paving the way for plebiscite.

About the part that this was only to be the principle on the basis of which the truce agreement was to be formulated, I have no reason to disagree. You are obviously stating this because you know the flimsy nature of your argument that there was no binding obligation on Pakistan to withdraw troops, both on principles of Statutory interpretation and the interpretation of Treaties. There is this rule called nosciter a sociss in interpretation, which basically means that the meaning of a word is known from the accompanying words. Actually, since the issue is whether there is a unilateral pre-condition on Pakistan to withdraw, what we need to see is whether there are other words around which show otherwise. The words you chose to show the same are that the process be ongoing, etc. etc.

Now let me quote that text the way a lawyer would quote it:

B. (1) When the Commission shall have notified the Government of Indiathat the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in PartII A2 hereof have withdrawn,thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further,that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawnfrom the State of Jammu and Kashmir,the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.

The question is, when is the Indian government supposed to act? The answer is, When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India .......Now as for your claim that it is to be read separately from the part about troop withdrawal, there is the use of the words and further,that the Pakistan forces..... that creates havoc with your reasoning. Just trust me, documents are not interpreted that way. Also, 2A1 clearly states that:

A. (1) As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council,the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.

What does that mean? That means that since the Pakistani troops were there, they needed to leave. Their presence was a material change that upset the premise of Resolution 47. Here again, Pakistan agrees to withdraw troops. Legal drafting does not follow the haphazard lines that you are suggesting. There is a further rule of interpretation that words cannot be interpreted so as to lead to an absurdity. If the security council had not intended the (ongoing) withdrawal of Pakistani troops, it would have not mentioned it to begin with, especially where the literal meaning includes it as part of what is to be notified by the Commission to India. To mention it in the manner I pointed out, only for it to be interpreted in the manner that you suggest, would be a legal absurdity.

Now coming to the logical bind that I mentioned earlier. Suppose, I accept your contention about Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops vis-a-vis the GoP will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal (of irregulars). The first mention troops in Pakistan’s control and the second those that are not. So according to you, the resolution says that after it has reported the withdrawal of those irregulars that are not actually in Pakistan’s control, it may or may not do something about the Troops that are actually in its control, depending upon the outcome of the negotiations? How does such a truce agreement work in the real world, can you elaborate?

As far as requirement for a plebiscite is concerned, demilitarization was a must. That can be understood from the fact that the second, third and fourth UNCIP reports focussed heavily on that. At the 570th Meeting dated 17 January 1952, the UN representative opined:

“The United Nations Representative deems it necessary to emphasize that, from his experience, he believes that any negotiations that could be undertaken by the United Nations to obtain the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir .... would find almost unsurmountable obstacles ..... unless in one way or another agreed solutions are found for the following: (1) a definite period for demilitarization; (2) the scope of demilitarization and quantum of forces that will remain at the end of the period of demilitarization; (3) the day for the formal induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator.”

It can also be ascertained from the text that you quoted from the McNaughton Report. Mind you, I am not saying that there was any requirement of a complete Pakistani troop withdrawal. Nor was there any requirement for a unilateral Pakistani troop withdrawal. That can be understood from the above-quoted text, as well as the fact that the negotiations after UNSC Resolution 98 dated 23 December 1952 were deadlocked due to a disagreement on the question of the level of withdrawal (paragraph 7 of the 12-point proposals). India wanted to maintain more troops than was suggested. Again, UNCIP could have done one of two things – a) come up with a number acceptable to both parties, or, b) reported to the UNSC that India was messing around, so please force India’s hands and ensure demilitarization, which will serve the pre-condition for plebiscite. Now what did it do? It did neither. The talks were called off, and that was the end of that. Why did UNSC not move a resolution in favour of Pakistan at that point? And why did Pakistan not agree to the additional 5,000 troops, if it was so confident of its victory in the plebiscite?

As for the complexity you quoted, that since neither quantum nor methodology for Pakistani withdrawal was quoted, so it could be fulfilled by a token gesture, completely misses the point. In fact it only adds to the certainty that any truce agreement would mitigate against such a mischief. Just as you stated with regard to the irregulars (since they are not under direct control), the subject of Pakistani troop withdrawal was left open to the satisfaction of the Commission. You have accepted a convenient ambiguity while rejecting an inconvenient one as showing that the requirement for notifying India means nothing.

I will address the point you made about the McNaughton report. As we noted above, negotiations got stalled on the issue of demilitarization. Now the Pakistani government does contend that it wants resumption of dialogue. Look, there is no reason to believe that dialogue can resume under the UNSC resolutions; none whatsoever. Even if we assume that dialogue under the UNSC framework could resume, apart from Pakistan’s willingness to initiate dialogue, is there any concrete evidence that the Pakistani government was/is willing to commit to troop withdrawal from Azad Kashmir? Sure, Pakistan says that it wants a resolution, but has any official Pakistani spokesperson ever gone on record stating that Pakistan will withdraw troops from Azad Kashmir?

Assuming that Pakistan was even willing to do so, what is Pakistan’s track record? In ’48 we sent irregulars and troops dressed as tribals while denying the fact until caught. In ‘65 again we did the same. In ’99 we again denied that it was our Army men on the Kargil heights, till our lie was exposed. In the interim we have been funding, training and arming trouble-makers who do exactly the same things that UNSC resolution are meant to safeguard Kashmiris from. So even if, by some miracle, Pakistan were willing to withdraw troops, who would believe that Pakistan wouldn’t destabilize the Valley by using its age-old tactics? Because we won’t change our ways, the Indians can keep stating that conditions are not right for a plebiscite until the cows come home.

When UNCIP was dissolved in 1951, giving way to UNMOGIP, that was the last time the UN made a mention of the “will of the people” in its resolution. The Dixon Report was the last serious attempt at a plebiscite, but by then the wheels were already coming off. I assume you are aware of the “doubtful” region formula suggested by Dixon. Pakistan had a narrow window of opportunity in 1948-49, where it could have removed its military when the UNCIP was fully involved and forced India’s hand. By 1951, we had missed the boat.

To recap:

1) The distinction drawn between irregulars and Pakistani troops and discrepancy between the two positions in Resolution 47 and Aug 13 1948 is due to the Pakistani government’s deceit about the presence of its Army. Hence they are to be treated pari materia, and not a subject matter of clever revisions. No law allows anyone to cheat and then take advantage of the same.

2) The interpretation that irregulars were required to be withdrawn but not troops leads to a logical absurdity and violates all known canons of interpretation.

3) The resolutions were just the principles along which final resolution was to take place. A series of events was to take place, which was stalled initially by Pakistan, and then seized upon by India. It may always have been India’s devious plan to not conduct a plebiscite, but Pakistan misconstrued its own obligations under the resolutions.

4) Pakistan always had the option of accepting India’s contention on the 12-point proposals and force India’s hand on the subject – it chose not to, made demands of its own. Basically, Pakistan rejected the plebiscite on the issue of 5,000 additional troops. The fact that the UNSC allowed the talks to collapse instead of moving a resolution against India shows that the UNSC treated Pakistani withdrawal as a condition precedent.

5) Because India has not accepted ICJ jurisdiction on the issue, the UNSC is its own judge in the matter. The UN has now dropped Kashmir from the list of disputed territories, and has repeatedly asserted that Kashmir is a bilateral issue. So the UN has basically overturned its prior position and laid down a new one. We can no longer seek recourse to Resolution 47, unless the UN changes its position.

6) Since we are being overly legalistic about it and not realizing that ground realities have changed so much in the past six decades that a plebiscite today will have no meaning, we should also know that legal claims have a limitation. After which these claims expire. Or the changes in circumstances make the last position meaningless, necessitating a completely new framework. Even if we were to be able to achieve the impossible task of convincing the UN to intervene, rest assured that it will not be upon our terms where things will be picked up from the collapse of the 12-point proposal.
 
I would like to start with certain preliminary observations:

- Our discussion on this subject is academic as for now, for the reason that ever since Kashmir was removed from the list of disputed territories under UN observation,
That is false - please provide a link to the 2014/2015 'list of disputed territories' to validate your assertion.
Pakistan’s claims that it continues to be a disputed territory are based outside the UN framework.
Not unless you substantiate your claim above.
 

Pakistan Affairs Latest Posts

Back
Top Bottom