Vinod2070
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It is not out of context if you think about it.
Towards a new & Improved Fauj
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It is not out of context if you think about it.
Clarify please.
muse
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The times they are achanging
Dr Manzur Ejaz
Pakistan’s socio-political system has reached a critical stage where the competition or confrontation between institutions is leading to an inevitable but unexpected change. An overwhelmingly agrarian Pakistani society has evolved into a multi-layered complex body where new urban middle classes have matured enough to play a role. If the dominant institutions of the military and political elites do not rapidly adjust to the changing reality, an unprecedented and disastrous situation can develop.
Whatever way we cut it, the incidents of the last month compelled the military to come to parliament and explain itself to the legislators and the public. Despite the chiding posture of General Shuja Pasha, this was a new development. But then, Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani issued a long rebuttal, a public criticism, after the 139th Corps Commander’s Conference. In this comprehensive statement, he reasserted the military’s monopoly over defining the ideology and policy of the state of Pakistan. If one dissects General Kayani’s statement, part of it is the military’s claim to define the country as an ‘Islamic’ state and other parts are operational policies as to how the country is going to be run.
What General Kayani and the army do not realise is that the military’s monopoly over the Pakistani state was the product of a set of historical factors that have substantially changed. Now, other institutions of the state are maturing to the level that a new inter-institutional balance has to evolve or the state will wither away.
Before the partition of India most of the business and professional classes were comprised of largely Hindus and partly Sikhs in areas that are included in Pakistan now. It is an interesting historical fact that conversion to Islam took place among the bulk of the rural peasantry and some ruling families. In the urban areas only artisan and working classes embraced Islam. Therefore, throughout the Muslim rule the urban business and state bureaucracy was always comprised of Hindus.
After 1947 the cleansing of Hindus completely from Punjab (the largest part of present-day Pakistan) and partially from other provinces created a complete vacuum. In this void, the military was the only organisation that was professionally organised. Muslim Punjabis and Pashtuns were adequately represented only in the military during the British Raj.
In the absence of the British overseeing and Hindu/Sikh professional classes, the institutions of the Pakistani state were like newly born babies who had scant knowledge of the workings of the state. All the institutions, specifically political, judicial and the media, lacked the depth and maturity to run a state. Therefore, it was easy — rather natural — for the military to step in and establish its monopoly over the key elements of the state.
The unnaturally quick rise of leaders in the military and civilian institutions was important as well. For example, captains or low level civil bureaucrats of this area could not have become generals or secretaries if the Hindus and Sikhs had not left. Therefore, a whole set of immature officialdom grabbed leadership in the military as well as in other institutions. This is one of the reasons that the military leadership did not restrain itself from imposing itself over society while other institutions were too weak to resist the overreaching of the armed forces.
With the passage of time, the other institutions have become mature. The early signs of such maturity appeared in the early part of the 1970s in which a progressive agenda was popularised by the PPP. Although the PPP was led by an enlightened feudal, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the main force of this movement was the middle class. As expected, the military reacted sharply by imposing a martial law and hanging Bhutto to reverse the new realignment of institutions where it had to let go of its monopoly. The military enhanced its monopoly after 1977 to forestall any new effort to rearrange the institutional balance. The civilian sectors that had issued their wish list in 1970 through the PPP could not defend and capitulated. For the next 30 plus years, the military has become used to its superiority. However, now it is facing opposition from much more mature civilian institutions.
In the last decade, the media, as an institution, was rising and having an impact on different sectors of society. The movement for the restoration of the independent judiciary also showed that a vital branch of the state was gaining enough maturity. The way the PML-N acted as an opposition party was also another sign of the strengthening of democratic forces. Despite the incompetent PPP government and its non-cooperation with the judiciary or with the genuine political opposition, it is becoming clearer that a realignment of institutional balance is underway. Therefore, the military is facing other sets of forces that are different from the 70s. In this situation, the military can unleash ruthlessness to suppress the emerging forces or concede to them as a fait accompli. Maybe the military has read the tea leaves as an ex-COAS, General Jehangir Karamat maintains, but it has yet to be seen how far the military can withdraw itself from civilian affairs.
The writer can be reached at manzurejaz@yahoo.com
Dr Manzur Ejaz
Pakistan’s socio-political system has reached a critical stage where the competition or confrontation between institutions is leading to an inevitable but unexpected change. An overwhelmingly agrarian Pakistani society has evolved into a multi-layered complex body where new urban middle classes have matured enough to play a role. If the dominant institutions of the military and political elites do not rapidly adjust to the changing reality, an unprecedented and disastrous situation can develop.
Whatever way we cut it, the incidents of the last month compelled the military to come to parliament and explain itself to the legislators and the public. Despite the chiding posture of General Shuja Pasha, this was a new development. But then, Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani issued a long rebuttal, a public criticism, after the 139th Corps Commander’s Conference. In this comprehensive statement, he reasserted the military’s monopoly over defining the ideology and policy of the state of Pakistan. If one dissects General Kayani’s statement, part of it is the military’s claim to define the country as an ‘Islamic’ state and other parts are operational policies as to how the country is going to be run.
What General Kayani and the army do not realise is that the military’s monopoly over the Pakistani state was the product of a set of historical factors that have substantially changed. Now, other institutions of the state are maturing to the level that a new inter-institutional balance has to evolve or the state will wither away.
Before the partition of India most of the business and professional classes were comprised of largely Hindus and partly Sikhs in areas that are included in Pakistan now. It is an interesting historical fact that conversion to Islam took place among the bulk of the rural peasantry and some ruling families. In the urban areas only artisan and working classes embraced Islam. Therefore, throughout the Muslim rule the urban business and state bureaucracy was always comprised of Hindus.
After 1947 the cleansing of Hindus completely from Punjab (the largest part of present-day Pakistan) and partially from other provinces created a complete vacuum. In this void, the military was the only organisation that was professionally organised. Muslim Punjabis and Pashtuns were adequately represented only in the military during the British Raj.
In the absence of the British overseeing and Hindu/Sikh professional classes, the institutions of the Pakistani state were like newly born babies who had scant knowledge of the workings of the state. All the institutions, specifically political, judicial and the media, lacked the depth and maturity to run a state. Therefore, it was easy — rather natural — for the military to step in and establish its monopoly over the key elements of the state.
The unnaturally quick rise of leaders in the military and civilian institutions was important as well. For example, captains or low level civil bureaucrats of this area could not have become generals or secretaries if the Hindus and Sikhs had not left. Therefore, a whole set of immature officialdom grabbed leadership in the military as well as in other institutions. This is one of the reasons that the military leadership did not restrain itself from imposing itself over society while other institutions were too weak to resist the overreaching of the armed forces.
With the passage of time, the other institutions have become mature. The early signs of such maturity appeared in the early part of the 1970s in which a progressive agenda was popularised by the PPP. Although the PPP was led by an enlightened feudal, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the main force of this movement was the middle class. As expected, the military reacted sharply by imposing a martial law and hanging Bhutto to reverse the new realignment of institutions where it had to let go of its monopoly. The military enhanced its monopoly after 1977 to forestall any new effort to rearrange the institutional balance. The civilian sectors that had issued their wish list in 1970 through the PPP could not defend and capitulated. For the next 30 plus years, the military has become used to its superiority. However, now it is facing opposition from much more mature civilian institutions.
In the last decade, the media, as an institution, was rising and having an impact on different sectors of society. The movement for the restoration of the independent judiciary also showed that a vital branch of the state was gaining enough maturity. The way the PML-N acted as an opposition party was also another sign of the strengthening of democratic forces. Despite the incompetent PPP government and its non-cooperation with the judiciary or with the genuine political opposition, it is becoming clearer that a realignment of institutional balance is underway. Therefore, the military is facing other sets of forces that are different from the 70s. In this situation, the military can unleash ruthlessness to suppress the emerging forces or concede to them as a fait accompli. Maybe the military has read the tea leaves as an ex-COAS, General Jehangir Karamat maintains, but it has yet to be seen how far the military can withdraw itself from civilian affairs.
The writer can be reached at manzurejaz@yahoo.com
muse
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A warning, a growing threat -- it centers around.....peace with India --- Fighting words for some, a threat to b e avoided for others - Which way will Pakistan turn? Will Pakistan , for once manage to not shoot itself in the foot??
Setting the course right
Shahzad Chaudhry
This state has major distortions in its conception and formulation. We used religion as a means to coalesce consensus and cultivate opinion on seeking independence. The Quaid, after gaining the state, suggested keeping religion out of state matters — to the uninitiated that is patent secularism. Soon after his death, however, our equally venerable leader, Liaquat Ali Khan, proposed and included the Objectives Resolution as a preamble to the constitution; this was meant to appease the religious lobby, by now raising their head and seeking their own footprint. It was only a matter of time before someone made it a part of the constitution. General Ziaul Haq did the honours through his Majlis-e-Shura, pleasing his Saudi mentors no end; in return they loaded him with oil money and a wide spread of Salafi-Wahabi madrassas introducing this nation to competitive Islam. Weapons would soon follow as would drugs to finance those weapons. Soon the tussle for the young nation was to keep it from becoming a theocracy. It did however earn the infamy of becoming a famed drug route and an arms free-market.
Before Zia did his deed, the ultimate liberal of Pakistani politics, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had the Ahmedis ostracised from the pale of Islam; he followed by reinforcing the religious façade through introducing prohibition on alcohol. This nation had lost its way even before it had consolidated its freedom.
Would you care to list the culprits of this sorry saga? The most profound names in our history are included!
In 1947 the Dogra ruler of Kashmir dithered in acceding to the new state of Pakistan on the expected lines of a Muslim majority state; a rebellion followed and he asked for the support of the Indian army to fight the rebellion. India sought an instrument of accession, which the Dogra ruler was happy to furnish and the Indian forces were allowed into Kashmir. The Quaid ordered his troops into Kashmir to fight off an engineered occupation and accession. The British chief of the newly liberated Pakistani army refused to fight Indian forces because they belonged to the British Crown and the Quaid was forced to order the use of lashkars (militias) from the tribal regions to supplement some troops of the Pakistani army under the command of then-Brigadier Akbar Khan to fight India’s troops. The current divide of Kashmir, one-third with Pakistan and two-thirds with India is how the first Indo-Pakistan war ended. Two influences from the experience became a part of the concept of the fledgling state: one, lashkars were a handy force in moments of difficulty; and two, our relationship with India soon after independence became that of an enemy. The Quaid used his best judgement under trying circumstances, unwittingly forging the future disposition of his state. Lashkars or their modern offshoots, militants and armed groups, remained in the service of the state when needed, and Pakistan’s foreign policy was pushed under the rubric of an inimical India. The story of India-centricity and use of armed groups in pursuing interests in Kashmir goes a long way back.
The 1965 Indo-Pak war was a consequence of ‘Operation Gibraltar’, codename for pushing in irregular forces in Kashmir to stir up a rebellion — this should sound familiar. This was conceived by none other than the then-Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Secretary Aziz Khan, and GOC 12 Division Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik. Soon after the war Foreign Minister Bhutto championed a 1,000 year war with India. India-centricity became endemic; the 1971 war when East Pakistan was lost to an armed Indian incursion only sealed the fate of what by then had become an entrenched facet of Pakistan’s national outlook. Since then our foreign policy towards India has remained stuck in a groove.
As Pakistan grapples with another insurgency on its western borders the legacy position towards India is openly being called into question. Then there are other factors like the civil-military imbalance that find an increasing mention of the military stalling a change in the foreign policy towards India; this is proffered popularly as the critical anchor around which the military retains enhanced relevance in national affairs and dominates the decision process. Such postulation fails to take into account how India-centricity has tended to find its place in the conception of the state and how it has found nourishment through history mostly based on how relations between the two states have taken shape over time and how all leaderships have internalised the sensitivity of the involved issues. It will always need a statesman in both India and Pakistan to change this course. It will also need a willing India now, more than a willing Pakistani military, to change the inimical dynamic. But yes, in terms of a distortion, it remains one that has afflicted how the Pakistani state has grown over the years in all its manifestations.
The final distortion without question remains frequent military rule that has alternated with political governments. Beginning with the ‘Rawalpindi Conspiracy’ to dislodge the Liaquat government by a radical-left communist putsch, it was to embed another unfortunate tradition of the military: finding opportune moments of weak political establishments or a divided polity to intervene and assume control. General Ayub Khan found it handy to enforce a martial law under his name rather than do the dirty bidding on Iskander Mirza’s behalf. Towards the end of his rule in 1969 the conditions had worsened enough again to warrant another martial law; when asked to enforce martial law Yahya quietly asked Ayub to relinquish and did the dirty deal while assuming power — divine justice, they call it. General Ziaul Haq responded to the political opposition’s goading to unseat Bhutto, his benefactor. The politicians of thence were equally to blame in not sustaining a political order. The final episode of the Musharraf rule was a consequence of an entirely personal clash between Mian Nawaz Sharif and his army chief, following Kargil. Indecision by the prime minister, more than anything, on sacking Musharraf provided the backdrop of an uncertain political environment in the country so conducive for the military to justify intervention.
Our work in the backdrop of such a historical legacy is cut out for us. To begin with, let’s ask a few questions of ourselves: how uncertain is the prevailing political environment in the country? How divided is the polity and how is such a divide neglecting issues of strategic decision-making and routine governance? Considering that an insurgency afflicts the nation, is there a consensus or a stated policy on how to handle this menace? Can we as starters convene a Commission of all political parties, a la the 18th/19th amendment kind, which could in a prolonged serious deliberation with all stakeholders design a security and a foreign policy for the state which can retain bipartisan support and concurrence of the nation? That just might help rectifying the three overarching, interlinked and dominating distortions in our national make-up and help us right the course. Someone should seem to be in charge. Dissension, chaos and uncertainty are anathema to a state; when that happens, the void engenders adventurism.
The writer is a political and defence analyst
Setting the course right
Shahzad Chaudhry
This state has major distortions in its conception and formulation. We used religion as a means to coalesce consensus and cultivate opinion on seeking independence. The Quaid, after gaining the state, suggested keeping religion out of state matters — to the uninitiated that is patent secularism. Soon after his death, however, our equally venerable leader, Liaquat Ali Khan, proposed and included the Objectives Resolution as a preamble to the constitution; this was meant to appease the religious lobby, by now raising their head and seeking their own footprint. It was only a matter of time before someone made it a part of the constitution. General Ziaul Haq did the honours through his Majlis-e-Shura, pleasing his Saudi mentors no end; in return they loaded him with oil money and a wide spread of Salafi-Wahabi madrassas introducing this nation to competitive Islam. Weapons would soon follow as would drugs to finance those weapons. Soon the tussle for the young nation was to keep it from becoming a theocracy. It did however earn the infamy of becoming a famed drug route and an arms free-market.
Before Zia did his deed, the ultimate liberal of Pakistani politics, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had the Ahmedis ostracised from the pale of Islam; he followed by reinforcing the religious façade through introducing prohibition on alcohol. This nation had lost its way even before it had consolidated its freedom.
Would you care to list the culprits of this sorry saga? The most profound names in our history are included!
In 1947 the Dogra ruler of Kashmir dithered in acceding to the new state of Pakistan on the expected lines of a Muslim majority state; a rebellion followed and he asked for the support of the Indian army to fight the rebellion. India sought an instrument of accession, which the Dogra ruler was happy to furnish and the Indian forces were allowed into Kashmir. The Quaid ordered his troops into Kashmir to fight off an engineered occupation and accession. The British chief of the newly liberated Pakistani army refused to fight Indian forces because they belonged to the British Crown and the Quaid was forced to order the use of lashkars (militias) from the tribal regions to supplement some troops of the Pakistani army under the command of then-Brigadier Akbar Khan to fight India’s troops. The current divide of Kashmir, one-third with Pakistan and two-thirds with India is how the first Indo-Pakistan war ended. Two influences from the experience became a part of the concept of the fledgling state: one, lashkars were a handy force in moments of difficulty; and two, our relationship with India soon after independence became that of an enemy. The Quaid used his best judgement under trying circumstances, unwittingly forging the future disposition of his state. Lashkars or their modern offshoots, militants and armed groups, remained in the service of the state when needed, and Pakistan’s foreign policy was pushed under the rubric of an inimical India. The story of India-centricity and use of armed groups in pursuing interests in Kashmir goes a long way back.
The 1965 Indo-Pak war was a consequence of ‘Operation Gibraltar’, codename for pushing in irregular forces in Kashmir to stir up a rebellion — this should sound familiar. This was conceived by none other than the then-Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Secretary Aziz Khan, and GOC 12 Division Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik. Soon after the war Foreign Minister Bhutto championed a 1,000 year war with India. India-centricity became endemic; the 1971 war when East Pakistan was lost to an armed Indian incursion only sealed the fate of what by then had become an entrenched facet of Pakistan’s national outlook. Since then our foreign policy towards India has remained stuck in a groove.
As Pakistan grapples with another insurgency on its western borders the legacy position towards India is openly being called into question. Then there are other factors like the civil-military imbalance that find an increasing mention of the military stalling a change in the foreign policy towards India; this is proffered popularly as the critical anchor around which the military retains enhanced relevance in national affairs and dominates the decision process. Such postulation fails to take into account how India-centricity has tended to find its place in the conception of the state and how it has found nourishment through history mostly based on how relations between the two states have taken shape over time and how all leaderships have internalised the sensitivity of the involved issues. It will always need a statesman in both India and Pakistan to change this course. It will also need a willing India now, more than a willing Pakistani military, to change the inimical dynamic. But yes, in terms of a distortion, it remains one that has afflicted how the Pakistani state has grown over the years in all its manifestations.
The final distortion without question remains frequent military rule that has alternated with political governments. Beginning with the ‘Rawalpindi Conspiracy’ to dislodge the Liaquat government by a radical-left communist putsch, it was to embed another unfortunate tradition of the military: finding opportune moments of weak political establishments or a divided polity to intervene and assume control. General Ayub Khan found it handy to enforce a martial law under his name rather than do the dirty bidding on Iskander Mirza’s behalf. Towards the end of his rule in 1969 the conditions had worsened enough again to warrant another martial law; when asked to enforce martial law Yahya quietly asked Ayub to relinquish and did the dirty deal while assuming power — divine justice, they call it. General Ziaul Haq responded to the political opposition’s goading to unseat Bhutto, his benefactor. The politicians of thence were equally to blame in not sustaining a political order. The final episode of the Musharraf rule was a consequence of an entirely personal clash between Mian Nawaz Sharif and his army chief, following Kargil. Indecision by the prime minister, more than anything, on sacking Musharraf provided the backdrop of an uncertain political environment in the country so conducive for the military to justify intervention.
Our work in the backdrop of such a historical legacy is cut out for us. To begin with, let’s ask a few questions of ourselves: how uncertain is the prevailing political environment in the country? How divided is the polity and how is such a divide neglecting issues of strategic decision-making and routine governance? Considering that an insurgency afflicts the nation, is there a consensus or a stated policy on how to handle this menace? Can we as starters convene a Commission of all political parties, a la the 18th/19th amendment kind, which could in a prolonged serious deliberation with all stakeholders design a security and a foreign policy for the state which can retain bipartisan support and concurrence of the nation? That just might help rectifying the three overarching, interlinked and dominating distortions in our national make-up and help us right the course. Someone should seem to be in charge. Dissension, chaos and uncertainty are anathema to a state; when that happens, the void engenders adventurism.
The writer is a political and defence analyst
Xeric
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VCheng
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Xeric: With all due respect, may I please ask why your argument at being shown any Army wrong-doing is merely to compare it to civilian wrong-doing, as if merely the fact that the Army is less of a thief by comparison is reason enough to continue doing whatever it is doing? Expecting someone else to take the first step to bail out the bilge water is a sure-fire way of sinking the entire ship of state.
muse
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I have tried, God knows I have, to point out that whenever Xeric or Agnostic resort to this argument that the Civilians are awful, it debases the armed forces, it reveals that far from correcting themselves, they just want ot point out that the armed forces steal less than those awful Civilians.
Xeric
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If you guyz had use any piece of your brains, i am sure you would have known that by posting the link i was not trying to compare the 'corruption' in the military with the civilians, BUT, was just pointing out that the fringing Audit Objections are as normal a happening in organizations/companies/institutions as you or me post here on this forum.
Now why would i do it? Well someone out of you was unable to comprehend the mechanics of Audits, was almost blank as regards to the procedures involved in settlement of these audits and/or penalties imposed if the audits remained unsettled and because his response was like someone who had never been employed (this includes self-employment).
Savvy?!
muse
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The campaign to De-radicalize those whose clinical condition Premier Gilani, suggests as a "unintended consequence", is in my opinion, misguided - while foreign funds will be consumed for this endeavor, the end result will be even more confusion - Why?
Because (read below) Pakistan and the Pakistan army continue to be in denial about who enabled and promoted this radicalism - and Pakistan and the Pakistan army, even now, refuse to give up the underlying ideology that sustains this radicalism -- When Premier Gilani notes the "unintended consequence" he only highlights the reality that while pointing fingers at everybody else, Pakistan and Pakistan Army continue to imagine that ignorance is bliss -- Pakistani civil society, the primary victims of this radicalism, know from bitter experience, that ignorance is anything but bliss.
De-radicalisation: deception or determination?
Dr Mohammad Taqi
Just as Pakistan was starting to witness yet another round of political violence in Karachi, a three-day national seminar on de-radicalisation, organised by the Pakistan Army, concluded in Swat earlier this month. Politicians, military leaders and opinion leaders from Pakistan as well as guests from other countries, attended the heavily guarded gathering. The full text of the lectures delivered and the conclusions of the seminar have not been made public yet but several speeches were instantly available through traditional and contemporary media.
Regardless of the merits or demerits of the event, the Pakistan Army deserves an acknowledgment for arranging the programme and for inviting a few token speakers who quite forcefully disagree with the army’s approach to handling the domestic and foreign affairs. One had hoped though that now when the word ‘de-radicalisation’, in its unhyphenated form, has entered the lexicon of counterterrorism, the people and intelligentsia of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA — regions worst hit by terror — had a more robust representation at the seminar.
Despite being in the top tier of the countries battered by terrorism in the name of religion, Pakistan is a relatively new entrant to the arena of establishing de-radicalisation programmes, the stillborn National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) notwithstanding. In his concluding address, Prime Minister Gilani made some remarks about the revival of NACTA, changes in the laws and criminal justice system, and the training and empowerment of the law enforcement agencies. But conspicuously absent from his — and General Ashfaq Kayani’s — speech was a candid acknowledgment of the genesis of terrorism coupled with religiosity, and how to go about developing a counter-narrative to that, if at all.
In a slick manner, General Kayani stuck to his current mantra, i.e. the army is subservient to the civilian institutions and will act in a circumspect manner in aid of the political leadership. While emphasising the ‘holistic’ nature of and taking full credit for pioneering the de-radicalisation programme, he said: “De-radicalisation effort was a result of the demand placed on the army by the post-operation environment. Driven by the detention of thousands of miscreants after the operation, our de-radicalisation programme was built around four pillars: de-radicalisation of juveniles, de-radicalisation of selected ‘reconcilable’ detainees, de-radicalisation of families of selected detainees to which they would fall back on release and the de-radicalisation of certain villages in general, from which the bulk of militants had originated.”
General Kayani — likely speaking for domestic consumption — was on the dot though in stating that military means alone cannot defeat extremism and the militancy that follows it in tandem. The General, prima facie, wants to treat a metastatic cancer but appears content to put a band aid on its minor manifestations without even trying to name, let alone exploring for the primary disease and attempting to remove it. Not a word was uttered about how a region that had voted overwhelmingly for centre-left political parties in February 2008 fell to the terrorists in under one year. It was Afzal Khan Lala of the Awami National Party (ANP), who pointed out in his speech that the militants were imposed on Swat from outside and the administration did not just stand idle but gave massive patronage to the terrorists. General Kayani was remiss in defining the contours of his ‘counter-radicalisation’ vision or how the jihadists came to rule the roost in Pakistan, in the first place.
This hapless job was left for Mr Gilani to tackle, who — speaking unmistakably to foreign audience — said: “The challenge of unintended radicalism and consequent terrorism is complex and a real barrier to a common goal of peace and stability. What we have witnessed today is a consequence of history and has an internal, regional and global context. Without a dispassionate strategy appraisal we can go wrong in our assessment and policy formulation on re-radicalisation (sic)...Pakistan’s security paradigm owes its genesis to traumatic events of the US-led Afghan jihad, inept post-Cold War handling of Afghanistan by the west, festering regional conflicts and post-9/11 war in Afghanistan.” Before emphasising his four ‘Ds’ of the de-radicalisation programme viz “dialogue, development, deterrence and defeating the extremists”, Mr Gilani went on to blame everyone and their uncle for imposing jihadism on Pakistan. The fifth ‘D’ might as well be denial!
The preponderance of research on de-radicalisation comes from work with four broad categories of groups and individuals. The first such group is the violent criminals, especially gang-members, who have been studied well, including their rehabilitation. However, research on how the organised political violence ends is still quite sparse. The work with Nazi and neo-Nazi groups in Europe, former communists in Europe and Japan and the radical Islamists in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, is where most of the current ‘best practices’ and benchmarks of success or failure and recidivism have emanated from.
There is growing awareness among the experts worldwide that defeat on the battlefield alone might not be enough to make the militants abandon violence. Just as prevention of new recruitment into radical and violent movements is imperative, so is the endeavour to induce de-radicalisation (implying renouncing violence and violent ideology), disengagement (abstaining from violence for personal, family or societal reasons without renunciation of violence), rehabilitation and the so-called ‘counter-radicalisation’ (preventing radicalisation), which is becoming pivotal to the counterterrorism efforts.
The de-radicalisation, disengagement and rehabilitation cannot succeed without first conducting an honest root cause analysis instead of a symptomatic treatment approach. The building of a counter-narrative requires serious introspection and asking hard questions. Laying the blame at others’ doorsteps suggests pathetic insight, if not outright dishonesty. It is imperative to look at the blunders committed in the name of national security, strategic depth and ideological frontiers, if one seeks real solutions. Ideological and religious reconstruction requires both words and actions. In an environment, where upright leaders like Salmaan Taseer are slain and rationalist scholars like Javed Ahmed Ghamdi are forced into self-exile, while assassins like Mumtaz Qadri are feted and terrorists like Malik Ishaq go scot-free, it would take far more than a seminar to defang, deglamorise, delegitimise and discredit the terrorists.
The state has to disown the violent characters and delusional security paradigms it has hatched over the past several decades. To orient the militants to de-radicalisation, the state has to reorient inwards rather than eyeing Kabul or Delhi. Otherwise, the de-radicalisation programmes may appear to be yet another deceptive fad to milk the foreign cash cows rather than a determined effort towards reform.
The writer can be reached at mazdaki@me.com. He tweets at Mohammad Taqi (mazdaki) on Twitter
Because (read below) Pakistan and the Pakistan army continue to be in denial about who enabled and promoted this radicalism - and Pakistan and the Pakistan army, even now, refuse to give up the underlying ideology that sustains this radicalism -- When Premier Gilani notes the "unintended consequence" he only highlights the reality that while pointing fingers at everybody else, Pakistan and Pakistan Army continue to imagine that ignorance is bliss -- Pakistani civil society, the primary victims of this radicalism, know from bitter experience, that ignorance is anything but bliss.
De-radicalisation: deception or determination?
Dr Mohammad Taqi
Just as Pakistan was starting to witness yet another round of political violence in Karachi, a three-day national seminar on de-radicalisation, organised by the Pakistan Army, concluded in Swat earlier this month. Politicians, military leaders and opinion leaders from Pakistan as well as guests from other countries, attended the heavily guarded gathering. The full text of the lectures delivered and the conclusions of the seminar have not been made public yet but several speeches were instantly available through traditional and contemporary media.
Regardless of the merits or demerits of the event, the Pakistan Army deserves an acknowledgment for arranging the programme and for inviting a few token speakers who quite forcefully disagree with the army’s approach to handling the domestic and foreign affairs. One had hoped though that now when the word ‘de-radicalisation’, in its unhyphenated form, has entered the lexicon of counterterrorism, the people and intelligentsia of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA — regions worst hit by terror — had a more robust representation at the seminar.
Despite being in the top tier of the countries battered by terrorism in the name of religion, Pakistan is a relatively new entrant to the arena of establishing de-radicalisation programmes, the stillborn National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) notwithstanding. In his concluding address, Prime Minister Gilani made some remarks about the revival of NACTA, changes in the laws and criminal justice system, and the training and empowerment of the law enforcement agencies. But conspicuously absent from his — and General Ashfaq Kayani’s — speech was a candid acknowledgment of the genesis of terrorism coupled with religiosity, and how to go about developing a counter-narrative to that, if at all.
In a slick manner, General Kayani stuck to his current mantra, i.e. the army is subservient to the civilian institutions and will act in a circumspect manner in aid of the political leadership. While emphasising the ‘holistic’ nature of and taking full credit for pioneering the de-radicalisation programme, he said: “De-radicalisation effort was a result of the demand placed on the army by the post-operation environment. Driven by the detention of thousands of miscreants after the operation, our de-radicalisation programme was built around four pillars: de-radicalisation of juveniles, de-radicalisation of selected ‘reconcilable’ detainees, de-radicalisation of families of selected detainees to which they would fall back on release and the de-radicalisation of certain villages in general, from which the bulk of militants had originated.”
General Kayani — likely speaking for domestic consumption — was on the dot though in stating that military means alone cannot defeat extremism and the militancy that follows it in tandem. The General, prima facie, wants to treat a metastatic cancer but appears content to put a band aid on its minor manifestations without even trying to name, let alone exploring for the primary disease and attempting to remove it. Not a word was uttered about how a region that had voted overwhelmingly for centre-left political parties in February 2008 fell to the terrorists in under one year. It was Afzal Khan Lala of the Awami National Party (ANP), who pointed out in his speech that the militants were imposed on Swat from outside and the administration did not just stand idle but gave massive patronage to the terrorists. General Kayani was remiss in defining the contours of his ‘counter-radicalisation’ vision or how the jihadists came to rule the roost in Pakistan, in the first place.
This hapless job was left for Mr Gilani to tackle, who — speaking unmistakably to foreign audience — said: “The challenge of unintended radicalism and consequent terrorism is complex and a real barrier to a common goal of peace and stability. What we have witnessed today is a consequence of history and has an internal, regional and global context. Without a dispassionate strategy appraisal we can go wrong in our assessment and policy formulation on re-radicalisation (sic)...Pakistan’s security paradigm owes its genesis to traumatic events of the US-led Afghan jihad, inept post-Cold War handling of Afghanistan by the west, festering regional conflicts and post-9/11 war in Afghanistan.” Before emphasising his four ‘Ds’ of the de-radicalisation programme viz “dialogue, development, deterrence and defeating the extremists”, Mr Gilani went on to blame everyone and their uncle for imposing jihadism on Pakistan. The fifth ‘D’ might as well be denial!
The preponderance of research on de-radicalisation comes from work with four broad categories of groups and individuals. The first such group is the violent criminals, especially gang-members, who have been studied well, including their rehabilitation. However, research on how the organised political violence ends is still quite sparse. The work with Nazi and neo-Nazi groups in Europe, former communists in Europe and Japan and the radical Islamists in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, is where most of the current ‘best practices’ and benchmarks of success or failure and recidivism have emanated from.
There is growing awareness among the experts worldwide that defeat on the battlefield alone might not be enough to make the militants abandon violence. Just as prevention of new recruitment into radical and violent movements is imperative, so is the endeavour to induce de-radicalisation (implying renouncing violence and violent ideology), disengagement (abstaining from violence for personal, family or societal reasons without renunciation of violence), rehabilitation and the so-called ‘counter-radicalisation’ (preventing radicalisation), which is becoming pivotal to the counterterrorism efforts.
The de-radicalisation, disengagement and rehabilitation cannot succeed without first conducting an honest root cause analysis instead of a symptomatic treatment approach. The building of a counter-narrative requires serious introspection and asking hard questions. Laying the blame at others’ doorsteps suggests pathetic insight, if not outright dishonesty. It is imperative to look at the blunders committed in the name of national security, strategic depth and ideological frontiers, if one seeks real solutions. Ideological and religious reconstruction requires both words and actions. In an environment, where upright leaders like Salmaan Taseer are slain and rationalist scholars like Javed Ahmed Ghamdi are forced into self-exile, while assassins like Mumtaz Qadri are feted and terrorists like Malik Ishaq go scot-free, it would take far more than a seminar to defang, deglamorise, delegitimise and discredit the terrorists.
The state has to disown the violent characters and delusional security paradigms it has hatched over the past several decades. To orient the militants to de-radicalisation, the state has to reorient inwards rather than eyeing Kabul or Delhi. Otherwise, the de-radicalisation programmes may appear to be yet another deceptive fad to milk the foreign cash cows rather than a determined effort towards reform.
The writer can be reached at mazdaki@me.com. He tweets at Mohammad Taqi (mazdaki) on Twitter
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To me, the title is rather misleading, it should have been "Towards an Improved Fauj", NEW is not needed. Nothing and no one is immune from making mistakes and Armed Forces is no exception. But there is a clear difference between civil and military corruption and wrong doings. Only a handful in Military, Admiral Mansoor alikes, did their bit with kick backs and what not. Now look at the civilian side, what we have here is a "Rotten Head" of state, leading the stream of corruption to every sector of Pakistan form PIA to Railway. One can imagine who is to blame for all this. End of story
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